United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CRAIG’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is presently before the Court on defendant
Craig’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings [docket entry 57]. Plaintiff has filed a
response in opposition. Pursuant to E.D. Mich. 7.1(f)(2), the
Court shall decide this motion without a hearing.
a former Detroit police officer, alleges that he was
wrongfully suspended (in 2010), prosecuted (in 2011), and
discharged (in 2013) after being falsely accused of receiving
pay for hours he had not worked. He also alleges that certain
of the defendants withheld information that would have
enabled him to disprove this accusation. Plaintiff asserts
claims against defendants, nine current and former members of
the Detroit Police Department, for violation of his due
process and equal protection rights, treating him differently
than similarly situated female police officers, negligence,
tortious interference with his rights under a collective
bargaining agreement, fraud, emotional distress, and
Craig, the Detroit Chief of Police since 2013, makes a number
of arguments in his motion, but the Court finds one to be
dispositive: Plaintiff “fails to establish any
connection between Chief James Craig and the allegations in
his Second Amended Complaint.” Def. Craig’s Mot.
at 2. The Court has searched the second amended complaint and
can find no substantive allegations directed specifically at
Craig. He is named as a defendant, see Second Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6, and he is included in Count II in
the list of defendants who allegedly violated
plaintiff’s due process and equal protection rights,
see Id. ¶ 55, but no factual allegations are
made as to Craig under this Count or elsewhere; his name is
not included in the title of this Count, which indicates that
the claim is being asserted against “defendants Godbee,
Lewis, Dolunt, Moore, Walton, Sevenkesen, and
Williams”; and in an earlier paragraph plaintiff
identifies “[t]he Section 1983 Defendants” as
“Moore, Walton, Serta, Dolunt, Lewis, and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c),
[j]udgment on the pleadings is proper “when no material
issue of fact exists and the party making the motion is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Paskvan
v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm’n, 946 F.2d
1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991). The “complaint must contain
direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements under some viable legal theory.”
Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins., 508
F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the court
construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, accepts the well-pled factual allegations as
true, and determines whether the complaint contains enough
facts to make the legal claims facially plausible.
Id. (citing United States v. Moriarty, 8
F.3d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Arsan v. Keller, No. 18-3858, 2019 WL 3494330, at *5
(6th Cir. Aug. 1, 2019). Similarly, under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper if
the complaint does not “contain sufficient factual
matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“Threadbare recitals of all the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. “Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
response is that
[s]ince the extent of Chief Craig’s knowledge, or basis
for possible exposure is not fully known at this stage of
proceedings, and since Plaintiff would be entitled to amend
his Complaint to conform to his proofs, and to the
Court’s finding of fact, Chief Craig should not be
dismissed unless and until a full record is developed of the
facts upon which he claims qualified immunity.
Resp. at 11. In other words, plaintiff has not alleged that
Craig was in any way involved because he has no knowledge of
any facts connecting Craig to any of his claims, and
plaintiff believes he should be permitted to conduct
discovery in search of facts establishing such a connection.
Craig is entitled to relief under both Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)
and 12(b)(6). The second amended complaint makes no
allegations linking Craig to any of plaintiff’s claims.
Nor, as is apparent from plaintiff’s response brief,
does plaintiff possess any facts that would allow the
inference to be drawn that any such link exists. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant Craig’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings or to dismiss for failure to state
a claim is granted. The second amended complaint is dismissed
as to defendant Craig.
 The title of the motion indicates that
defendant Craig seeks “judgment on the pleadings in
lieu of an answer.” The motion’s supporting
brief, at pages 3 and 4, indicates that Craig seeks judgment
on the pleadings or dismissal for failure to state a claim.