United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND NON-TAXABLE COSTS (Doc. 96)
AVERN
COHN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
I.
Introduction
This is
a case under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA),
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692. In 2015, plaintiff sued multiple
defendants claiming violations of the FDCPA and
Michigan's Occupational Code (MOC), M.C.L.
§§339.915. Due to difficulties in serving many of
the defendants, summons were extended. Eventually, plaintiff
dismissed all but ten (10) defendants either voluntarily or
by settlement. All of the 10 defendants were served. None
responded. The Clerk entered defaults against each of the 10
defendants. Eventually, plaintiff filed a second amended
motion for entry of a default judgment. (Doc. 89). Plaintiff
sought a default judgment in the amount of $201, 000.00. The
Court granted the motion (Doc. 92) and entered a Judgment
(Doc. 93).
Before
the Court is plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and
no-taxable costs.[1] In the motion, which is unopposed,
plaintiff seeks $29, 832.50 in attorney fees and $739.82 in
non-taxable costs. (Doc. 96). For the reasons that follow,
the motion will be granted.
II.
Legal Standard
The
FDCPA provides for a mandatory award of attorney's fees
to a prevailing consumer, Tolentino v. Friedman, 46
F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1995). These mandatory fees reflect
Congress's intent that the Act be enforced by
debtor's counsel acting as private attorneys general.
See DeJesus v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 918
F.2d 232, 235 (1st Cir. 1990).
At the
same time, fee awards should encourage counsel to undertake
these types of cases and provide compensation which is
commensurate with other types of cases. Gusman v. Unisys
Corp., 986 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1993). In so doing,
courts generally apply the lodestar method in conjunction
with a request for fees, see e.g., Cruz v. Local Union
No. 3, 34 F.3d 1148, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994); see Savino
v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 87-88 (2d Cir.
1998). Courts have also observed that “FDCPA plaintiffs
‘seek to vindicate important rights that cannot be
valued solely in monetary terms.'” Bogner v.
Masari Investments, LLC, 2010 WL 2595273, (D. Az. 2010)
The mandated payment of attorney's fees under the FDCPA
serves a punitive purpose. Sanders v. Jackson, 209
F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2000).
The
starting point for this calculation of a reasonable
attorney's fees award “should be the determination
of the fee applicant's ‘lodestar,' which is the
proven number of hours reasonably expended on the case by an
attorney, multiplied by his [or her] court-ascertained
reasonable hourly rate.” Adcock-Ladd v. Sec'y
of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000)(citing
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). A
calculation of the number of hours reasonably expended can
involve consideration of three issues, (1) whether the lawyer
actually worked the number of hours claimed, (2) whether the
work performed was sufficiently related to the points on
which the plaintiff prevailed, and (3) whether the attorney
used poor judgment in spending too many hours on some part of
the case or by unnecessarily duplicating the work of
co-counsel. See Coulter v. State of Tennessee, 805
F.2d 146, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1986). The party seeking an award
of fees bears the burden of demonstrating that the request is
reasonable. See Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp.,
898 F.2d 1169, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990). To determine a
reasonable hourly rate for attorney's fees, the courts
look to the prevailing market rate for similar services of
local attorneys with comparable skill, experience, and
reputation. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1989).
III.
Discussion
Here,
Attorney Bolos and the rest of the Lyngklip & Associates
staff have expended over 264 hours to resolve this case. The
billing records attached to the motion provide a
chronological listing of those hours, identifying the staff
member who expended the time and the amount of time expended.
The Court finds after review that the work performed was
necessary, reasonably related to the file, directed at moving
the matter through the legal system expeditiously.
Of the
264 hours billed, across ten staff members, 75 hours were
billed by four paralegals, 14 hours were billed by one summer
law clerk, nearly 6.8 hours were billed by Senior Attorney
Lyngklip, and 167.80 hours were billed by four associate
attorneys, including Attorney Bolos. Bolos billed 127.90 of
those hours, constituting nearly 80% of all time billed by
attorneys and 48% of all time billed across all staff
members. Bolos has reduced her total billing time by 66.30
hours, a 52% reduction in her time billed. Additionally, of
the total hours billed of 264.10 hours, plaintiff identified
140.05 hours attributable to dismissed defendants,
duplication of efforts, and unnecessary work and accordingly
reduced the requested billable time by 140.05 hours to 124.05
hours - netting a 53% reduction of the time billed. (Exhibit
9 - Adjusted Billing Records). Plaintiff's discretionary
billing amounted to a reduction in the amount billed from
$63, 955.00 to $29, 832.50. Plaintiff's billing reduction
reflects appropriate billing discretion and provides a
reasonable check on the overall amount of this petition. In
short, plaintiff is entitled to the requested amount of
attorney fees.
In
addition to attorney fees, plaintiff is entitled to an award
of "non-taxable" costs. See Bryant v. City of
Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1100 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2000);
Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 826
F.2d 43, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("We believe that it would
be unduly restrictive to find that neither the general term
‘costs of litigation' nor the term
‘attorney's fees' includes incidental expenses
of attorneys that are routine to all litigation and routinely
billed to private clients."). Non-taxable costs include
time for paralegals and staff. Missouri v. Jenkins,
491 U.S. 274 (1989), as well as travel and other ordinary
expenses that "are typically charged to paying clients
by private attorneys.” Davis v. City of San
Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1556 (9th Cir.1992).
Here,
to identify and locate the defendants, plaintiff's
counsel sought account holder information for the phone
numbers, websites, and PO Box addresses at issue from several
third parties. To secure production in response to her
requests and related directly to these ten remaining
...