United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
[#15] TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[#12], TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[#13], AND REMANDING MATTER FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
DENISE
PAGE HOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
I.
BACKGROUND
This
matter is before the Court on a Report and Recommendation
(Doc # 15) filed by Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris to
grant the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff
Robert Nowicki (“Nowicki”) (Doc # 12) and to deny
the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”)
(Doc # 13). The Commissioner has timely filed two objections
to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc # 16) Having conducted
a de novo review of the parts of the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation to which valid
objections have been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1), the Court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the Report and
Recommendation, GRANTS Nowicki's Motion for Summary
Judgment, DENIES the Commissioner's Motion for Summary
Judgment, and REMANDS this case for further consideration.
The
background facts of this matter are adequately set forth in
the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, and the
Court adopts them here.
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
The
standard of review by the district court when examining a
Report and Recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
636. This Court “shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or the
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which an
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The
court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” Id. In order to preserve the right to
appeal the magistrate judge's recommendation, a party
must file objections to the Report and Recommendation within
fourteen (14) days of service of the Report and
Recommendation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file
specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right
of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985);
Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs.,
932 F.2d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).
B.
The Commissioner's Objections
1.
First Objection
The
Commissioner first claims that the Magistrate Judge erred in
finding that the Administrative Law Judge's
(“ALJ”) step 3 analysis was not supported by
substantial evidence. Specifically, the Commissioner alleges
that Nowicki could not have possibly met Listings of
Impairment 12.04 or 12.06. The Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge and finds that the issue of whether there
was any evidence of Listings of Impairment 12.04 or
12.06 should be remanded for a proper determination by the
ALJ.
A
“disability” is the “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Commissioner determines whether a claimant is disabled by
analyzing five sequential steps. The third step that is at
issue requires a determination of whether the claimant's
severe impairments meet or equal the criteria of an
impairment set forth in the Commissioner's Listing of
Impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).
The ALJ
initially determined that listings 12.04 and 12.06 were not
met because there was supposedly no evidence showing that
paragraphs B or C were satisfied. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404, Subpt. P, App'x 1, 12.00(G)(1). The
Magistrate Judge found that there was substantial evidence to
support a finding that paragraph C could have been met. The
Magistrate Judge specifically referred to Dr. Peter Trent
Smith's mental progress notes and Nowicki's three
psychiatric hospitalizations in 2016 that occurred within a
span of three months. Due to that evidence, the Magistrate
Judge ruled that Nowicki's case should be remanded to the
ALJ to further grapple with that evidence.[1] (Doc # 15, Pg ID
1135)
The
Commissioner argues that the Court should concur with the
ALJ's decision since courts have ruled that remand is not
required when the ALJ “made sufficient factual findings
elsewhere in his decision to support his conclusions at step
three.” See, e.g., Forrest v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 591 Fed.Appx. 359, 365-66 (6th Cir. 2014).
Although the Commissioner's cited case law is accurate,
the Court finds that the standard referred to by the
Commissioner has not been met because the ALJ failed to
sufficiently make factual findings elsewhere in his
decision to support his conclusion. The ALJ did
acknowledge that Nowicki was hospitalized on several
occasions in 2016, but did not explain why those
hospitalizations-in conjunction with other facts-are
inadequate for purposes of proving that Paragraph C has been
satisfied. Therefore, the Court finds that the Magistrate
Judge was correct, and the ALJ provided insufficient
reasoning for his determination that Nowicki did not meet
step 3. This issue will consequently be remanded to the ALJ
for a more in-depth analysis of the merits of whether Nowicki
satisfies step 3.
The
Magistrate Judge does not address in her Report and
Recommendation which type of remand applies, so the Court
will do so now. The Supreme Court recognizes only two kinds
of remands involving social security cases-those pursuant to
sentence four and those pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89,
99 (1991); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617,
626 (1990). The Supreme Court concluded that Congress's
explicit delineation in ยง 405(g) regarding circumstances
under which remands are authorized clearly ...