United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CARLO WILSON'S MOTION
LIMITING USE OF MENTAL COMPETENCY EVIDENCE (Dkt.
A. Goldsmith United States District Judge
matter is before the Court on Defendant Carlo Wilson's
motion for an order that any confidential matters disclosed
for purposes of a mental competency evaluation and hearing
cannot be used against him for any other purposes (Dkt. 999).
The Government has filed a response in opposition to the
motion (Dkt. 1017), to which Wilson replied (Dkt.
1036). For the reasons discussed below, the Court
denies the motion.
25, 2019, Wilson filed a motion for a mental competency
hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (Dkt. 965). In support of
that motion, Wilson submitted a report from Dr. George W.
Woods, Jr., in which Dr. Woods opines that Wilson is not
presently competent to stand trial (Dkt. 965-1). The Court
granted the motion on July 3, 2019, finding that there was
reasonable cause to believe Wilson may presently be suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to stand trial, and it directed the U.S. Marshals
Service to transport Wilson to Metropolitan Correctional
Center (“MCC”) Chicago for a mental competency
evaluation. See 7/3/2019 Order at 1-2 (Dkt. 976).
For purposes of that evaluation, the Court also ordered the
(1) That a psychiatrist or psychologist at MCC Chicago be
directed to examine the mental condition of Wilson, see
id. §§ 4241(a), (b), 4247(b);
(2) That the examining psychiatrist or psychologist prepare,
as soon as practical, a written report that includes (1)
Wilson's history and present symptoms; (2) a description
of the psychiatric, psychological, and medical tests that
were employed and their results; (3) the examiner's
findings; and (4) the examiner's opinions as to
diagnosis, prognosis, and whether Wilson is suffering from a
mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent
to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense, see 18 U.S.C. §§
4241(b), 4247(c); and
(3) That the examiner shall promptly file the written report
with this Court and provide copies of the report to defense
counsel and the attorney for the government, see id.
§ 4247(c). The report may be used by any party for
purposes of a competency hearing, detention hearing, or any
other purpose the Court may order.
Id. at 1-2.
now seeks to limit the use of any disclosures he makes during
the course of the mental competency evaluation, as well as
various protections from disclosure to the Government of
certain information Wilson's counsel provides to the
evaluators at MCC Chicago. The Court will address
Wilson's requests in turn.
Limiting Use of Wilson's Statements Elicited During the
Evaluation and Derivative Evidence for the Purpose of
Determining Mental Competency Only
protect his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, Wilson argues
that “any and all information” elicited from him
during the mental competency evaluation, including statements
and evidence derived from those statements, “be limited
in use to the competency proceeding and that it not be used
in any other way or at any other stage of the
proceedings.” Def. Mot. at 5. In support of this
request, Wilson primarily relies on Rule 12.2(c) and caselaw
applying that rule. See generally id. at
7-15. Rule 12.2, however, “does not deal with the issue
of mental competency to stand trial.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
12.2 advisory committee note. Because Wilson's situation
is controlled entirely by 18 U.S.C. § 4241, the specific
protections afforded by Rule 12.2 are inapplicable.
United States v. Thompson, 462 Fed.Appx. 561, 565
(6th Cir. 2012).
the Fifth Amendment may still preclude the use of
Wilson's mental competency evaluation evidence at trial.
See United States v. Nguyen, 962 F.Supp. 1221, 1225
(E.D. Cal. 1997). Thus, the Court agrees with Wilson that, in
accordance with his privilege against self-incrimination
under the Fifth Amendment, the Government's use of any
evidence derived from the mental competency evaluation is
limited to determining whether Wilson is competent to stand
trial, unless Wilson uses that evidence during either the
guilt or penalty phase of the trial. See id.;
see also Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 604 (4th
Cir. 1996) (“[A] defendant has no Fifth Amendment
protection against the introduction of mental health evidence
in rebuttal to the defense's psychiatric
evidence.”). Although Wilson states that he “has
not endorsed a mental defense at trial, ” see
Def. Reply at 3, Wilson has not expressly stated that he will
not use any mental competency evidence outside the context of
the competency hearing.
while a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel before submitting to any mental health
examination that represents a “critical stage” of
that defendant's prosecution, Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454, 468-470 (1981), in this context, the right
“at most requires that defense counsel be informed of
the ‘nature and scope' of the evaluation and put
‘on notice' that he would have to anticipate the
prosecution's use of the mental exam if he raised a
‘mental status defense.'” Thompson,
462 Fed.Appx. at 564 (quoting Buchanan v. Kentucky,
483 U.S. 402, 424-425 (1987)). Here, both of those
preconditions are met, so there could be no Sixth Amendment
Wilson has affirmatively decided whether he will use any
mental competency evidence outside the context of the
competency hearing, his request for an order limiting the use
of such evidence at this juncture is premature and denied