United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Sean F.
Cox District Judge
REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION TO DEEM WITHDRAWN PLAINTIFF'S INITIAL
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 11), GRANT PLAINTIFF'S
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 15), DENY
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 18), AND
REMAND THIS MATTER TO THE COMMISSIONER FOR FURTHER
ACTION
ANTHONY P. PATTI, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I.
RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons that follow, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Court
GRANT Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment (DE 15), DENY Defendant's
motion for summary judgment (DE 18), and
REMAND this matter to the Commissioner for
further action.[1]
II.
REPORT
Plaintiff,
Theresa Marie Chappell, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (âCommissionerâ) denying her
application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits.
This matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge for
a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment (DE 15), the Commissioner's cross-motion
for summary judgment (DE 18), Plaintiff's reply (DE 19),
and the administrative record (DE 7).
A.
Background and Administrative History
Plaintiff
applied for SSI on June 20, 2014. (R. at 349-354.) Plaintiff
alleges her disability began on February 10, 2014, at the age
of 48, at which point the Social Security Administration
(SSA) considers her a “[y]ounger person.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c), 416.963(c). (R. at 349.) In
her disability report, she lists several conditions (anxiety,
high blood pressure, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
and back injury due to an accident at work) as limiting her
ability to work. (R. at 395.) Her application was denied on
September 24, 2014. (R. at 186-202, 240-243.)
1.
Initial hearing and decision
In
October 2014, Plaintiff requested a hearing by an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. at
246-248.) Plaintiff turned 50 years old on December 8, 2015,
at which point the Social Security Administration considers
her a “[p]erson closely approaching advanced
age.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(d), 416.963(d).
(R. at 349, DE 15 at 31.)
On
January 22, 2016, ALJ Andrew G. Sloss held a hearing, at
which Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE), Michelle Robb,
testified. (R. at 155-185.) On the same date, Plaintiff
amended her alleged onset date (AOD) to June 19, 2014, which
happens to be the same day as a neurology progress note by
neurologist Mouaz Sbei, M.D. (R. at 368, 1519-1656.) On
February 2, 2016, ALJ Sloss issued an opinion, which
determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act. (R. at 203-224.)
Plaintiff
submitted a request for review of the hearing decision/order.
(R. at 294-296.) On February 6, 2017, the Appeals Council
remanded the case to the ALJ for resolution of issues
concerning: (a) “decisional language
explaining which findings from the prior decision remain
binding and which do not[;]” (b)
further consideration of Plaintiff's migraines at Step 2
of the sequential evaluation; (c) further
assessment of the opinion evidence (because the state
agency's physical RFC assessment was performed by a
single-decision maker (SDM)); and, (d)
further specification of which of Dr. Kaul's limitations
are included in Plaintiff's RFC, given that the ALJ
accorded “partial weight” to Dr. Kaul's
opinions. (R. at 225-230.)
2.
Subsequent hearing and decision
On July
13, 2017, ALJ Sloss held a hearing, at which Plaintiff and a
vocational expert (VE), Judith Findora, testified. (R. at
137-154.) On August 1, 2017, ALJ Sloss issued an opinion,
which determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 11-34.)
Plaintiff
submitted a request for review of the hearing decision/order.
(R. at 346-348.) However, on April 25, 2018, the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (R. at
1-6.) Thus, ALJ Sloss's decision became the
Commissioner's final decision.
Plaintiff
timely commenced the instant action on May 3, 2018.
B.
Plaintiff's Medical History
The
administrative record contains approximately 1, 614 pages of
medical records, which were available to the ALJ at the time
of his August 1, 2017 decision. (R. at 32-34, 473-2, 086
[Exhibits 1F-31F].) These materials will be discussed in
detail, as necessary, below.
C.
The Administrative Decision
Pursuant
to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4), at
Step 1 of the sequential evaluation process,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since June 19, 2014, which he described as
“the application date” but which is more
accurately the amended AOD. (R. at 16, 368.) At Step
2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following
severe impairments: osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease
(DDD), and migraine headaches. (Id. at 16-18.) At
Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments. (Id. at 18-19.) Between Steps 3
and 4 of the sequential process, the ALJ evaluated
Plaintiff's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”)[2] and determined that Plaintiff had the RFC:
. . . to perform light work [i.e., exertional
limitations]. . . except that the claimant can
occasionally climb ramps or stairs and can frequently balance
[i.e., postural limitations]. The claimant
must also avoid even moderate exposure to hazards
[i.e., environmental limitations].
(Id. at 19-26.) At Step 4, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past
relevant work. (Id. at 26.) At Step
5, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work
experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that there were jobs
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy
that Plaintiff could perform, such as cleaner, cashier, and
packer. (Id. at 27.) The ALJ therefore concluded
that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in
the Social Security Act, since June 19, 2014. (Id.
at 27-28.)
D.
Standard of Review
The
District Court has jurisdiction to review the
Commissioner's final administrative decision pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case under the
Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the
Commissioner's decision if it ‘is supported by
substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal
standards.'” Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. at 2009) (quoting
Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241
(6th Cir. at 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under this
standard, “substantial evidence is defined as
‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241
(quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). In deciding
whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision,
the court does “not try the case de novo,
resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of
credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506,
509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247
(“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing
court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including
that of the claimant.”).
Although
the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not
trivial. The Court must “‘take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the]
weight'” of the Commissioner's decision.
TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's decision, this Court defers
to that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence
in the record that would have supported an opposite
conclusion.'” Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v.
Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). Finally,
even if the ALJ's decision meets the substantial evidence
standard, “‘a decision of the Commissioner will
not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own
regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the
merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial
right.'” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting
Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746
(6th Cir. 2007)).
E.
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