United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
HON.
GORDON J. QUIST, JUDGE
Plaintiff,
Terrence Lee Taylor, a prisoner incarcerated with the
Michigan Department of Corrections, filed a complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several Defendants,
alleging the following claims: (1) violation of
Plaintiff's First Amendment right of access to the
courts; (2) retaliation against Plaintiff for his exercise of
his First Amendment rights; (3) violation of Plaintiff's
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; and (4) violation of
Plaintiff's equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Following dismissal of Defendants Woods, Norton,
and Ross based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his
administrative grievance remedies (ECF No. 53), the case
proceeded against Defendants Smith and Clark. On October 27,
2016, Judge Bell dismissed Plaintiff's
access-to-the-courts claim, concluding that Plaintiff failed
to show an actual injury. (ECF No. 100 at PageID.543.) Judge
Bell also dismissed Plaintiff's due process claim, but
allowed Plaintiff's retaliation and equal protection
claims to proceed against both Smith and Clark. (Id.
at PageID.546-48.) On December 14, 2016, Magistrate Judge
Greeley denied Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint
to add allegations regarding his dismissed
access-to-the-courts claim. (ECF No. 107.)
On June
15, 2017, this Court held a jury trial on Plaintiff's
retaliation and equal protection claims. At the conclusion of
trial, the jury found for Defendants on both claims. (ECF No.
134.) Plaintiff appealed the judgment to the Sixth Circuit.
On August 30, 2018, the Sixth Circuit issued an order denying
Plaintiff's appeal as to the trial-related issues but
sustaining the appeal as to Plaintiff's argument that he
should have been allowed to amend his complaint to shore up
his access-to-the-courts claim. The Sixth Circuit reasoned
that Plaintiff's amendment sufficiently alleged an actual
injury because Plaintiff alleged that he could not
effectively present his claims to the state court absent his
trial transcripts, which Defendants had confiscated. (ECF No.
154 at PageID.845.)
Following
remand, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the
access-to-the-courts claim. On July 29, 2019, Magistrate
Judge Maarten Vermaat issued a Report and Recommendation (R
& R) recommending that the Court grant Defendants'
motion because Plaintiff cannot establish prejudice and
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 172
at PageID.1080.) The magistrate judge noted that Plaintiff
obtained a copy of his trial transcripts and filed a motion
for relief from judgment pursuant to M.C.R. 6.502 on October
6, 2016, in which he raised eight issues-two more than he
claimed he included in his 2013 motion that Plaintiff alleges
Defendants prevented him from filing. (Id. at
1082-83, 1085-86, 1092.) The magistrate judge also noted that
the state court considered and denied every claim on the
merits that Plaintiff raised in his 2016 motion. Given these
facts, the magistrate judge concluded that Plaintiff
“has not shown that he was denied the ability to
present any claim due to the alleged delay in bringing his
motion for relief from judgment under MCR 6.502.”
(Id. at PageID. 1091.) Finally, the magistrate judge
concluded that Plaintiff's allegation that three claims
he could have made at the time his transcripts were
confiscated-failure to swear in the jury; newly discovered
evidence that cast doubt on a witness's trial testimony
six years earlier; and a resentencing issue under People
v. Lockridge, 488 Mich. 358, 870 N.W.2d 502 (2015)-were
foreclosed when Plaintiff eventually filed his motion for
relief from judgment is without merit, as Plaintiff included
such claims in his 2016 motion and the state court considered
them on the merits. (Id. at 1092.)
Plaintiff
has filed an objection to the R & R, arguing that the
magistrate judge erroneously concluded that Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b), upon receiving an objection to a report and
recommendation, the district judge “shall make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” After conducting a de novo review
of the R & R, Plaintiff's objection, and the
pertinent portions of the record, the Court concludes that
the R & R should be adopted.
Plaintiff
does not argue that the magistrate judge erred in concluding
that Plaintiff fails to show that the lack of a transcript
prevented him from presenting or developing one or more of
his claims. Instead, he argues that the magistrate judge
erred by “not mak[ing] an independent determination as
to whether the underlying claims were frivolous as required
by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996).”
(ECF No. 173 at PageID.1095.) Regardless of whether
Plaintiff's claims were frivolous or had some arguable
merit, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that
Plaintiff failed to demonstrate prejudice because he was not
prevented from presenting a claim to the state court.
Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge should have
conducted his own independent analysis of Plaintiff's
claims because, according to Plaintiff, the state court
either applied the incorrect standard or erred in applying
the correct standard. Plaintiff miscomprehends the magistrate
judge's analysis and the scope of relief available an
access-to-the-courts claim under § 1983. The R & R
does not recommend that the Court grant summary judgment on
the underlying claims in Plaintiff's motion for relief
from judgment. The state court already ruled on these claims.
Instead, the R & R recommends granting summary judgment
on Plaintiff's access-to-the-courts claim asserted in
this federal court. This Court has no authority in this
§ 1983 action to review Plaintiff's state-court
claims. “[L]ower federal courts possess no power to sit
in direct review of state court decisions.” Atl.
Coast Line R.R Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398
U.S. 281, 296, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1748 (1970); see also
Collins v. Collins, 597 F.Supp. 33, 39 (N.D.Ga. 1984)
(“Federal courts are not in the business of hearing
attacks on state court judgments where the judgment is not on
its face violative of the Constitution and where the state
has provided an opportunity for appellate review to satisfy
the requirements of due process.”). As Plaintiff
implicitly recognizes, the proper vehicle for seeking relief
as to the state-court's rulings-to the extent they
present a federal constitutional issue-is a petition for
habeas corpus, which Plaintiff has already filed in the
Eastern District of Michigan. (ECF No. 173 at PageID.1097-98
(stating as to sufficiency of the evidence claim: “The
fact that the state court denied relief is not relevant to
the district court's determination as to whether the
underlined [sic] claim was ‘nonfrivolous' or
‘arguable.' It is very much possible that the
Eastern District of Michigan where the claim is presently
pending within a habeas corpus petition (No. 2:18-cv-11711)
may grant relief on the issue.”).) See Lee v.
Willard, No. 14-2605, 2015 WL 3404085, at *8 (E.D. La.
May 26, 2015) (“The cornerstone of adequate court
access . . . is the ability to present a claim, not the right
to obtain a ruling of one's liking. Save his opportunity
to pursue his allegations on habeas corpus grounds,
. . . Lee may not seek review of those state courts'
decisions by casting a complaint in the form of a civil
rights action.”); Jelks v. White, No. 07-00127
ACK-LEK, 2007 WL 879243, at *3 (D. Haw. Mar. 20, 2007)
(observing that the plaintiff's access-to-the-courts
claim asserted in a habeas corpus petition, “if brought
under this court's original jurisdiction and not as a
review of the state court's ruling, must be brought
as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983")
(italics added).
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the July 29, 2019,
Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 172) is
ADOPTED as the Opinion of this Court.
Plaintiff's Objection (ECF No. 173) is
OVERRULED.
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 163) is GRANTED,
and Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
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