Michael L. Knight, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
United States of America, Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal
from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee of Chattanooga. Nos. 1:10-cr-00120-1;
1:14-cv-00132-Harry S. Mattice, Jr., District Judge.
ON
BRIEF:
Paul
D. Clement, Edmund G. LaCour Jr., Kasdin M. Mitchell, Megan
M. Wold, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant.
John
P. Taddei, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., Debra A. Breneman, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,
Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: COOK, McKEAGUE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
HELENE
N. WHITE, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Petitioner-Appellant
Michael L. Knight appeals the district court's denial of
his motion to amend his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition to
challenge his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (use
of a firearm during and in relation to a "crime of
violence") in light of Johnson v. United
States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) ("Johnson
II"). While Knight's appeal was pending, the
Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the definition
of "crime of violence" in § 924(c)(3)(B) is
unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis,
139 S.Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019).
The
government concedes that under Davis kidnapping in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) is not a "crime of
violence" and thus Knight's conviction under §
924(c) for using a firearm during and in relation to
kidnapping must be vacated. The government maintains,
however, that Knight's conviction under § 924(c) for
using a firearm during assault and robbery in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2114(a) should be affirmed because that offense
qualifies under the "elements clause" of the
definition of a "crime of violence" in §
924(c)(3)(A). We agree. Accordingly, we VACATE Knight's
§ 924(c) conviction for using a firearm during a
kidnapping, AFFIRM Knight's § 924(c) conviction for
using a firearm during an assault and robbery of a postal
employee, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I.
A
superseding indictment charged Knight with ten counts: (1)
and (2) two counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344; (3) assault and robbery of a person having
control of mail matter or government property in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2114(a); (4) possession of stolen property
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114(b); (5) use of a
firearm during assault and robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c); (6) kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a); (7) use of a firearm during kidnapping in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (8) carjacking in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119; (9) use of a firearm
during carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c);
and (10) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Knight pled guilty to
one count of bank fraud and, at the conclusion of his trial,
a jury found him guilty on all other counts. The district
court sentenced Knight to a total term of 955 months of
imprisonment.
After
exhausting his direct appeals, Knight filed a motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255. Knight later moved to amend his petition
to assert claims that his convictions under § 924(c) are
invalid because the residual clause of the crime-of-violence
definition in § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague
in light of Johnson II. Observing that this court
held in United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340,
376-79 (6th Cir. 2016) that the residual clause of §
924(c)(3)(B) is not unconstitutionally vague, the district
court denied Knight's § 2255 petition as well as his
request to amend the petition. Knight appealed, and this
court granted Knight's application for a certificate of
appealability regarding his motion to amend to add the
Johnson II claims.
While
this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held in
Davis that the residual clause of the definition of
crime of violence in § 924(c)(3)(B) is
unconstitutionally vague. 139 S.Ct. at 2336. The government
concedes that Knight's kidnapping conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 1201(a) is not a crime of violence. We
therefore vacate the related § 924(c) conviction.
II.
The
government maintains that Knight's conviction for assault
and robbery of a postal employee under 18 U.S.C. §
2114(a) is a crime of violence under the ...