United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Stephanie Dawkins Davis Magistrate Judge
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND
SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
David
M. Lawson United States District Judge
On
August 7, 2019, plaintiff William Sim Spencer filed his pro
se complaint in which he seeks injunctive relief restraining
the defendant from making any further efforts to collect
money or impose consequences allegedly including possible
arrest or incarceration stemming from state court proceedings
to collect on the plaintiff's unpaid child support
obligations. The plaintiff asserts that a Michigan statute,
which governs the collection of judgments for unpaid support
obligations is unconstitutional as applied to him because he
has been denied the opportunity to raise any meaningful
contest to the judgment for unpaid support. He also contends
that any obligation that he had to pay amounts he previously
was adjudged to owe was extinguished by a release of the
judgment lien. Contemporaneously with his complaint, the
plaintiff filed a motion for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction.
The
plaintiff's principal allegations stem from the
proceedings in state court to collect unpaid child support,
and he attached several items of correspondence to his
complaint evidencing the history of those proceedings. On
March 17, 2016, the plaintiff was informed by a letter from
the Oakland County, Michigan circuit court that a support
dispute had been closed due to his incarceration. Letter
dated Mar. 17, 2016, ECF No. 1, PageID.8. However, on May 16,
2016, the plaintiff received another letter stating that
“the previous arrearages were added back to the case at
the request of the plaintiff as the defendant will be
released from incarceration in August and entering the
workforce again.” Letter dated May 16, 2016, ECF No. 1,
PageID.10. The plaintiff contends that he now is under threat
of unjust seizures of property or arrest due to efforts by
the defendant to collect the arrearages that he contends were
extinguished by the March 2016 correspondence. As the
magistrate judge observed, the public record of the
proceedings in the Oakland County circuit court indicates
that a proceeding for collection of unpaid child support was
instituted against the plaintiff and a support enforcement
order was issued on August 1, 2019, assessing an amount of
unpaid support exceeding $75, 000. Support Enforcement Ord.,
ECF No. 11, PageID.59 (Oakland Cty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2019).
The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to clarify the
amount of the support due, Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 11,
PageID.62, and a show cause hearing was scheduled for
September 3, 2019.
As
noted above, the plaintiff filed his complaint in this Court
on August 7, 2019, and he contemporaneously filed his motion
for injunctive relief. The Court referred the case to the
assigned magistrate judge for all pretrial proceedings. On
August 30, 2019, the magistrate judge issued a report in
which she recommended that the Court deny the motion for
early injunctive relief and sua sponte dismiss the case under
the Younger abstention doctrine, see Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which holds that federal
courts should not entertain litigation that would interfere
with the orderly progress of state court criminal
prosecutions and certain categories of civil proceedings,
such as contempt prosecutions for failure to pay child
support. The plaintiff filed voluminous objections to the
report and recommendation in which he asserts that the report
is riddled with numerous “errors of fact.”
However, after conducting a de novo review of the report and
the record of the proceedings, the Court finds that the
plaintiff has not identified any error in the principal
conclusion that the magistrate judge reached, which is that
the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of abstention.
The
filing of timely objections to a report and recommendation
requires the court to “make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
‘ 636(b)(1); see also United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). This de novo
review requires the court to re-examine all of the relevant
evidence previously reviewed by the magistrate judge in order
to determine whether the recommendation should be accepted,
rejected, or modified in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. ‘
636(b)(1). “The filing of objections provides the
district court with the opportunity to consider the specific
contentions of the parties and to correct any errors
immediately, ” Walters, 638 F.2d at 950, enabling the
court “to focus attention on those issues-factual and
legal-that are at the heart of the parties' dispute,
”, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985). As a result,
“‘[o]nly those specific objections to the
magistrate's report made to the district court will be
preserved for appellate review; making some objections but
failing to raise others will not preserve all the objections
a party may have.'” McClanahan v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 837 (6th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers
Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987))
Where,
as here, a plaintiff has asked the Court to waive fees and
costs because he cannot afford to pay them, the Court has an
obligation to screen the case for merit and dismiss the case
if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is
frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see
also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).
“A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact if
it . . . is based on legal theories that are indisputably
meritless.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863,
866 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
327-28). Although a pro se litigant's complaint must be
construed liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007), “[t]he leniency granted to pro se
[litigants] . . . is not boundless.” Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). The
screening mandated by Congress in section 1915(e)(2) includes
the obligation to dismiss civil complaints filed by
prospective pro se filers if they “fail[] to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). To avoid
dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The Court may dismiss a complaint on its own
initiative if the complaint lacks an arguable basis when
filed. Goodell v. Anthony, 157 F.Supp.2d 796, 799
(E.D. Mich. 2001).
In this
case, all of the requisites for Younger abstention are amply
established by the facts pleaded in the complaint and evident
from the public record. “The Younger abstention
doctrine counsels a federal court to abstain from
adjudicating a matter properly before it in deference to
ongoing state criminal proceedings, and [in certain types of]
civil and administrative proceedings.” Tindall v.
Wayne County Friend of Court, 269 F.3d 533, 538 (6th
Cir. 2001) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982)). “Three
considerations have emerged for determining when abstention
is appropriate: (1) whether the underlying proceedings
constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) whether
the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3)
whether there is an adequate opportunity in the state
proceedings to raise a constitutional challenge.” Ibid.
“Where a review of these considerations suggests that
the state court should properly adjudicate the matter, a
federal court should abstain and order the federal complaint
dismissed. If, however, a plaintiff can demonstrate
extraordinary circumstances such as bad faith, harassment,
flagrant unconstitutionality, or another unusual circumstance
warranting equitable relief, then a federal court may decline
to abstain.” Ibid. The question whether Younger
abstention warrants summary dismissal of a case “may be
raised by the court sua sponte.” O'Neill v.
Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 2008).
First,
the complaint and the state court record of proceedings
plainly establish that there is an ongoing proceeding against
the plaintiff for collection of unpaid child support,
Rene M v. Spencer, William S., Case No.
1994-471049-DM (Oakland Cty. Cir. Ct.), and that the gravamen
of the suit here is an attempt to obstruct that proceeding by
means of separate relief obtained from this Court. Second, it
is well settled circuit law that family court proceedings for
collection of unpaid child support implicate important state
interests, and federal courts should not issue injunctions
that would interfere in such proceedings absent
“extraordinary circumstances.” E.g.,
Tindall, 269 F.3d 533 (remanding for dismissal on
the basis of Younger abstention); Sevier v. Turner,
742 F.2d 262, 270 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he federal
courts, absent ‘extraordinary circumstances,' must
abstain from granting declaratory or injunctive relief [that
would interfere with state court proceedings for civil
contempt for willfully failing to pay child support] because
doing so would involve unduly intrusive interference with,
and monitoring of, the day-to-day conduct of state hearings
and trials.”). The plaintiff repeats throughout his
papers the vague and non-specific assertion that the support
enforcement proceeding was commenced in “bad faith,
” but he has not identified the sort of
“extraordinary circumstances” that would warrant
injunctive interference by this Court. See Parker v.
Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 10 (6th Cir. 1980) (“Should
the Tennessee appellate courts be unable or unwilling to
correct continuing unconstitutional conduct by the Juvenile
Court judges, plaintiffs would then be in a position of
showing ‘exceptional circumstances' which would
warrant federal injunctive relief.” (emphasis added)).
Third,
as the Sixth Circuit has recognized, there will be ample
opportunity for the plaintiff to obtain review of his
constitutional and other claims of error either before the
state trial court, or, if any final judgment is rendered, in
the state appellate courts. Ballard v. Stanton, 833
F.2d 593, 594 (6th Cir. 1987) (“The actions alleged to
constitute evidence of bad faith on the part of the
defendants in the instant appeal can all properly be
challenged, either by motion to the trial court, or later on
appeal to the state appellate courts. As such, Ballard
plainly ha[s] an adequate opportunity to have [her]
constitutional defenses heard and determined during the
course of the state court proceedings. Where there exists the
possibility of raising and correcting constitutional claims
in state courts, the principles of federalism and comity
expressed in Younger require that a . . . defendant must
first exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking
relief in the District Court.”); see also
Tindall, 269 F.3d at 539 (“Although the
Supreme Court has recognized that bad-faith prosecution of an
individual may serve as a proper exception to the Younger
abstention doctrine, we have found no Supreme Court case that
has ever authorized federal intervention under this
exception. Such cases thus are exceedingly rare, particularly
where a plaintiff seeking to defeat an abstention argument
has failed to avail himself first of state appellate
processes before seeking relief in federal court.”).
The
plaintiff's objections that there is no ongoing state
proceeding and that state court proceedings to enforce child
support obligations do not comprise any important state
interest are unsupported by any legal authority and contrary
to the facts disclosed by the public record and the well
settled law of this circuit. His numerous other claims that
the magistrate judge misapprehended certain factual details
shown by the pleadings and the public record are immaterial
where the undisputed facts evident from the record clearly
establish that abstention is warranted. The plaintiff's
objections all therefore are either irrelevant or without
merit.
Accordingly,
it is ORDERED the report and recommendation (ECF No. 11) is
ADOPTED, and the plaintiff's objections (ECF No. 13) are
OVERRULED.
It is
further ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
It is
further ORDERED that the plaintiff's motions for
injunctive relief and to file further motions (ECF ...