United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
HONORABLE ROBERT J. JONKER JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAARTEN VERMAAT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is
a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Jaye Bruckner is incarcerated
with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the Saginaw
County Correctional Facility (SRF) in Freeland, Saginaw
County, Michigan. In 2016, Petitioner pleaded nolo
contendere in the Chippewa County Circuit Court to
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.520b. On December 6, 2016, the court
sentenced Petitioner as a habitual offender to 21 years and 8
months to 60 years in prison.
After
Petitioner was appointed appellate counsel, Petitioner asked
the trial court for leave to withdraw his plea. The trial
court denied his motion. Petitioner then sought leave to
appeal his conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals,
arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to withdraw the plea because Petitioner's plea
was not knowing and voluntary; it was the product of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals
summarily denied leave to appeal for lack of merit in the
grounds presented. (Mich. Ct. App. Order, ECF No. 7-11,
PageID.221.)
Petitioner
subsequently applied for leave to appeal in the Michigan
Supreme Court. That court summarily denied leave to appeal on
June 20, 2017, because it was not persuaded the questions
presented should be reviewed by the court. (Mich. Order, ECF
No. 7-12, PageID.273.)
Petitioner
filed a petition under § 2254 in this Court in March
2018, raising the following four grounds for relief:
I. Miranda Rights Violation[.]
II. Ineffective assi[s]tance of counsel[.]
III. 3 motions to compel[] discovery of original audio and
motion to strike audio due to original destroyed[.]
IV. DHS and prosecutor failed to follow forensic Protocol.
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6, 7, 9, 10.)
Respondent
has filed an answer to the petition (ECF No. 6) arguing that
the grounds should be denied because they have not been
exhausted and/or they are meritless. Petitioner has filed a
reply. (ECF No. 9.) Upon review and applying the standards of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA), I find that the
grounds are meritless. Accordingly, I recommend that the
petition be denied.
Discussion
I.
AEDPA standard
This
action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA).
The AEDPA “prevents federal habeas
‘retrials'” and ensures that state court
convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the
law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). An
application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in state court unless the adjudication: “(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is “intentionally
difficult to meet.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S.
__, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (internal quotation omitted).
A
federal habeas court may issue the writ under the
“contrary to” clause if the state court applies a
rule different from the governing law set forth in the
Supreme Court's cases, or if it decides a case
differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts. Bell, 535 U.S.
at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06).
“To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is
required to ‘show that the state court's ruling on
the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.'” Woods, 135
S.Ct. at 1376 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). In other words, “[w]here ...