United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT
(ECF NO. 1)
D. Borman United States District Judge.
Tywaun Coakley's pro se civil rights complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is before the Court for initial
screening following a grant of in forma
pauperis status. (ECF No. 4.) Under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A and 1915(e), and 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c)(1), the Court is required to dismiss the case before
service on defendants if it determines that the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Having made such a
finding, the Court will dismiss the complaint.
names as defendants Detective Steve Posey, the Detroit Police
Department, and (in caption only) the City of Detroit,
Michigan. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff's brief factual
allegations address only Det. Posey's conduct and consist
of the following:
In September 2016, Detective Posey did give sworn testimony
that he knew to be false at a probable cause hearing against
the Plaintiff in order to obtain a first degree murder
indictment against the Plaintiff.
Detective Posey gave testimony that the Plaintiff did confess
to the murder on paper and or video.
This testimony was found to be false.
(Compl. at 6, ECF No. 1, PageID 6.) Plaintiff's requested
relief is for $1, 000, 000 plus costs for mental duress and
recovery of legal fees and “lost of wages.”
(Id. at 9.)
Screening Procedure and Pleading Standards
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the
Court is required to dismiss sua sponte an in
forma pauperis complaint before service if it determines
that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B),
1915A(b). When evaluating a complaint under that standard,
courts “construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true, and examine whether the complaint
contains ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d 193, 203
(6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). A pro se civil rights complaint is
to be construed liberally. Boag v. MacDougall, 454
U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
” as well as “a demand for the relief
sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), (3). “[D]etailed
allegations” are not necessary, but under Rule 8(a) the
pleading must “‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). This standard “demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 677 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
“a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed
favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused
by a person acting under the color of state law.”
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549
(6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must also
allege “more than just mere negligence, ”
Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312, 317 (6th
Cir. 2000) (citations omitted), and must establish the
liability of each individual defendant by that person's
own conduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
are ineligible for Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
Jinks v. Richland Cty., S.C., 538 U.S. 456, 466
(2003). However, “[a] municipality faces § 1983
liability only when its execution of a policy or custom is
the ‘moving force' behind the constitutional
violation.” Deruso v. City of Detroit, 121
Fed.Appx. 64, 65 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Sova v. City of
Mt. Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898, 904 (6th Cir. 1998)). And a
city agency, such as its police department, is not a proper
party in a section 1983 action; rather, the municipality
itself is the “real party in interest.”
Haverstick Enter., Inc. v. Fin. Fed. Credit, Inc.,
32 F.3d 989, 992, n. 1 (6th Cir. 1994).