United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
MARK DENTLER, Personal Representative of the Estate of MATTHEW JOHN DENTLER, Plaintiff,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant,
KENT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Commissioner)
which denied claimant’s application for disability
insurance benefits (DIB).
Matthew John Dentler, alleged a disability onset date of
December 15, 2008. PageID.293. Claimant identified his
disabling conditions as “5 bypass heart surgery,
” high blood pressure, blood sugar, and tingling
sensation in feet. PageID.285. Prior to applying for DIB,
claimant completed the two years of college (welding and
blueprint reading), and had past employment as senior
manufacturing technician and general construction worker.
PageID.297. An Administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewed
claimant’s application de novo and entered a
written decision denying benefits on June 7, 2017.
PageID.33-44. This decision, which was later approved by the
Appeals Council, has become the final decision of the
Commissioner and is now before the Court for review.
Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is
typically focused on determining whether the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); McKnight v.
Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1990).
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of
evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Cutlip v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir.
1994). A determination of substantiality of the evidence must
be based upon the record taken as a whole. Young v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 925 F.2d 146
(6th Cir. 1990).
scope of this review is limited to an examination of the
record only. This Court does not review the evidence de novo,
make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.
Brainard v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The fact
that the record also contains evidence which would have
supported a different conclusion does not undermine the
Commissioner’s decision so long as there is substantial
support for that decision in the record. Willbanks v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 847 F.2d 301,
303 (6th Cir. 1988). Even if the reviewing court would
resolve the dispute differently, the Commissioner’s
decision must stand if it is supported by substantial
evidence. Young, 925 F.2d at 147.
claimant must prove that he suffers from a disability in
order to be entitled to benefits. A disability is established
by showing that the claimant cannot engage in substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months.
See 20 C.F.R. §404.1505; Abbott v.
Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). In applying
the above standard, the Commissioner has developed a
The Social Security Act requires the Secretary to follow a
“five-step sequential process” for claims of
disability. First, plaintiff must demonstrate that she is not
currently engaged in “substantial gainful
activity” at the time she seeks disability benefits.
Second, plaintiff must show that she suffers from a
“severe impairment” in order to warrant a finding
of disability. A “severe impairment” is one which
“significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities.” Third, if plaintiff is
not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe
impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve
months, and the impairment meets a listed impairment,
plaintiff is presumed to be disabled regardless of age,
education or work experience. Fourth, if the plaintiff's
impairment does not prevent her from doing her past relevant
work, plaintiff is not disabled. For the fifth and final
step, even if the plaintiff’s impairment does prevent
her from doing her past relevant work, if other work exists
in the national economy that plaintiff can perform, plaintiff
is not disabled.
Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d
528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and
severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the
fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant
work through step four. Jones v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). However, at
step five of the inquiry, “the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the
economy that accommodate the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational
profile.” Id. If it is determined that a
claimant is or is not disabled at any point in the evaluation
process, further review is not necessary. Mullis
v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988).
application for disability benefits failed at the fifth step
of the evaluation. At the first step, the ALJ found that
claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from
his alleged onset date of December 15, 2008, through his date
last insured of September 30, 2015, with an exception for
approximately three weeks in January and February 2013
(during which he worked as a welder).
PageID.35. At the second step, the ALJ found that
through his date last insured (September 30, 2015), claimant
had severe impairments of “coronary artery disease with
a history of multi-vessel bypass grafting and diabetes
mellitus with neuropathy.” Id.
third step, the ALJ found that through his date last insured,
claimant did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or equaled the requirements of the
Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.
1. PageID.36. The ALJ decided at the fourth step that:
On or before September 30, 2015, the claimant had the
residual functional capacity to perform medium work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except he could not climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he could not balance, stoop, or
crouch more than frequently; and he could not kneel, crawl,
or climb stairs/ramps more than occasionally. He could not
operate leg/foot controls; he could not work at unprotected
heights or around dangerous moving machinery; and he could
not operate motor vehicles more than frequently.
PageID.37. The ALJ also found that through the date last
insured, claimant was unable to perform his past ...