Dentler v. Commissioner of Social Security

          OPINION

          RAY KENT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Commissioner) which denied claimant’s application for disability insurance benefits (DIB).^[1]

         Claimant, Matthew John Dentler, alleged a disability onset date of December 15, 2008. PageID.293. Claimant identified his disabling conditions as “5 bypass heart surgery, ” high blood pressure, blood sugar, and tingling sensation in feet. PageID.285. Prior to applying for DIB, claimant completed the two years of college (welding and blueprint reading), and had past employment as senior manufacturing technician and general construction worker. PageID.297. An Administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewed claimant’s application de novo and entered a written decision denying benefits on June 7, 2017. PageID.33-44. This decision, which was later approved by the Appeals Council, has become the final decision of the Commissioner and is now before the Court for review.

         I. LEGAL STANDARD

         This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is typically focused on determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1990). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cutlip v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). A determination of substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole. Young v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 925 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1990).

         The scope of this review is limited to an examination of the record only. This Court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The fact that the record also contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner’s decision so long as there is substantial support for that decision in the record. Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). Even if the reviewing court would resolve the dispute differently, the Commissioner’s decision must stand if it is supported by substantial evidence. Young, 925 F.2d at 147.

         A claimant must prove that he suffers from a disability in order to be entitled to benefits. A disability is established by showing that the claimant cannot engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1505; Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). In applying the above standard, the Commissioner has developed a five-step analysis:

The Social Security Act requires the Secretary to follow a “five-step sequential process” for claims of disability. First, plaintiff must demonstrate that she is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time she seeks disability benefits. Second, plaintiff must show that she suffers from a “severe impairment” in order to warrant a finding of disability. A “severe impairment” is one which “significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Third, if plaintiff is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment meets a listed impairment, plaintiff is presumed to be disabled regardless of age, education or work experience. Fourth, if the plaintiff's impairment does not prevent her from doing her past relevant work, plaintiff is not disabled. For the fifth and final step, even if the plaintiff’s impairment does prevent her from doing her past relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy that plaintiff can perform, plaintiff is not disabled.

Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

         The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work through step four. Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). However, at step five of the inquiry, “the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant’s residual functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile.” Id. If it is determined that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in the evaluation process, further review is not necessary. Mullis v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988).

         II. ALJ’s DECISION

         Claimant’s application for disability benefits failed at the fifth step of the evaluation. At the first step, the ALJ found that claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from his alleged onset date of December 15, 2008, through his date last insured of September 30, 2015, with an exception for approximately three weeks in January and February 2013 (during which he worked as a welder). PageID.35.^[2] At the second step, the ALJ found that through his date last insured (September 30, 2015), claimant had severe impairments of “coronary artery disease with a history of multi-vessel bypass grafting and diabetes mellitus with neuropathy.” Id.

         At the third step, the ALJ found that through his date last insured, claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the requirements of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. PageID.36. The ALJ decided at the fourth step that:

On or before September 30, 2015, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except he could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he could not balance, stoop, or crouch more than frequently; and he could not kneel, crawl, or climb stairs/ramps more than occasionally. He could not operate leg/foot controls; he could not work at unprotected heights or around dangerous moving machinery; and he could not operate motor vehicles more than frequently.

PageID.37. The ALJ also found that through the date last insured, claimant was unable to perform his past ...