United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
JULIUS C. CLARKWILLIS #726262 Plaintiff,
STEVE ADAMSON, Defendant.
Robert J. Jonker Chief U.S. District Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAARTEN VERMAAT U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
a civil rights action brought by state prisoner Julius C.
ClarkWillis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ClarkWillis
claims that Defendant Steve Adamson denied him a religious
diet in violation of his First Amendment
rights. Defendant Adamson filed a motion for
summary judgment and asserts that he is entitled to qualified
immunity. (ECF No. 29.) For the reasons stated below, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court deny
Defendant Adamson's motion.
pleadings and subsequent filings in this case present a
confusing picture of events. After thoroughly reviewing the
Complaint (ECF No. 1) and the summary judgment briefs (ECF
Nos. 29 and 36), the undersigned interprets the facts as
early 2017, ClarkWillis began studying the Islamic faith and
the Holy Quran while he was incarcerated in the Ionia
Correctional Facility (ICF). He alleges that his religion
requires him to eat a halal diet, which means that he cannot
eat pork or “pork by-products” and can only eat
other meats if they were properly prepared.
March 1, 2017, ClarkWillis requested to have his religious
preference changed to Al-Islam and to take the religious diet
test. On April 14, 2017, ClarkWillis signed the religious
meal participation agreement and took the religious diet
test. The religious test involved an interview with Chaplain
Cheney. On April 26, 2017, while ClarkWillis was waiting for
a decision on his diet request, he was transferred from ICF
to the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP). Defendant Adamson was
not involved in the decision to transfer ClarkWillis to MBP.
ClarkWillis states that ICF is the only level 5 facility that
provides a Muslim halal diet and that MBP does not
accommodate such a diet.
2, 2017, ClarkWillis received a memorandum informing him that
Defendant Adamson had denied his request for the religious
diet. The memorandum noted that “while it is difficult
to discern sincerity based on external indicators, it was
decided not to transfer [ClarkWillis] to a facility where
[his] requested religious diet could be accommodated.”
(ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
claims that the denial of the religious diet violated his
federal rights and sues Defendant Adamson in his official
capacity. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) He seeks “to
be transferred to [a] facility that provides [his] religious
diet accommodation and approved for the Halal Muslim
diet” and “to be compensated for the time that my
rights ha[ve] been violated.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
Summary Judgment Standard
judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there
are no genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of Ohio,
Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard
for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
McGowan, 421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all
justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the
motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins.
Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2005).