United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Nathaniel K. Owusu, a.k.a. Nathaniel Porter, Plaintiff,
Michigan Department of Corrections Pain Management Committee, et al., Defendants.
Judge Mona K. Majzoub
ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ,
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS , AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXPAND RECORD 
E. LEVY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court are two motions for summary judgment. First is
defendants Corizon Health, Inc., Keith Papendick, M.D., Susan
Wilson, N.P., Bryan Buller, M.D., Corey Grahn, N.P., Danielle
Paquette, P.A., Michael Milette, P.A., Craig Hutchinson,
M.D., and Oliver Johnson, M.D.’s (together, the
“Corizon defendants”) motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 155, PageID.1969.) Second is defendants
the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”)
Pain Management Committee, William Borgerding, Gary Kerstein,
Teri Byrne, Theresa Merling, and Michael Brown’s
(together, the “MDOC defendants”) motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 185, PageID.3519.)
Judge Mona K. Majzoub issued a report and recommendation on
July 19, 2019 (“R&R”), recommending that the
motions be granted, and the case be dismissed. (ECF No. 194,
PageID.4102.) Plaintiff Nathaniel K. Owusu filed four
objections to the R&R on August 14, 2019. (ECF No. 198,
PageID.4156.) Owusu’s filing contained an objection to
Judge Majzoub’s separate opinion and order of July 19,
2019, denying his motion to strike the Corizon
defendants’ reply in support of their motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 193.)
reasons set forth below, Owusu’s objections are
overruled. Both motions for summary judgment are granted and
the case is dismissed with prejudice.
filed this action on June 30, 2016, bringing thirteen counts
against defendants alleging violations of his First, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights related to his medical
treatment while in prison. (ECF No. 1.) Owusu’s claims
are more fully set forth in the R&R (ECF No. 194,
PageID.4103–4105), but include counts for grossly
inadequate medical treatment, delay and denial of treatment
for serious medical conditions, retaliation, and deliberate
indifference resulting in infliction of pain. (ECF No. 1.)
Owusu alleges that he suffers from, among other conditions,
degenerative musculoskeletal disease that causes him chronic
pain. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7–9.) Owusu initiated several
grievances relating to his medical care, as set forth below,
and this case relates to the subject matter set forth in
Objection to Opinion and Order (ECF No. 193)
first objection regards Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s
non-dispositive opinion and order denying Owusu’s
motion to strike (the “Order”). (ECF No. 193.)
The Corizon defendants filed a reply in support of their
motion for summary judgment on January 14, 2019. (ECF No.
173.) Owusu filed a motion to strike the reply as untimely.
(ECF No. 177.) The Order denied Owusu’s motion to
strike and declined “to entertain the parties’
quibbling over the timeliness of Plaintiff’s and the
Corizon Defendants’ responsive briefing.” (ECF
No. 193, PageID.4100.)
“[c]ourts have wide discretion to manage their own
dockets.” Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471
(6th Cir. 1999); and see In re Univ. of Mich., No.
19-1636, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 25304, at *6, ___F.3d.___(6th
Cir. Aug. 23, 2019) (“Congress has given district
courts great control over their dockets. After all, the
modern federal district judge faces a challenge-she must
balance administering just and lawful outcomes with the need
to move cases along.”)
objection on a non-dispositive pretrial matter will only be
granted if he can show that “any part of the order [ ]
is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); see 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A). “Clear error will be found only when the
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Max Trucking,
LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., 802 F.3d 793, 808 (6th
Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470
U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
argues that the Order is “contrary to law” and
“highly prejudicial” because “in almost
verbatim fashion, the [M]agistrate [J]udge adopted the
defendants’ arguments that plaintiff failed to exhaust
administrative remedies without carrying their ‘high
burden’ of persuasion in their summary judgment
motion.” (ECF No. 198, PageID.4156.) Owusu’s
argument is conclusory and does not identify a clear error
committed by the Magistrate Judge requiring that the Order be
set aside. The Order was well within the Magistrate
Judge’s discretion to manage the docket in this case.
Therefore, this objection is overruled.
Objections to R&R
are Owusu’s objections to the R&R. For the reasons
set forth below, his objections are overruled.
Legal Standard for Objections on Dispositive
may object to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation on dispositive motions, and a district judge
must resolve proper objections under a de novo standard of
review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)–(C); Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b)(1)–(3). “For an objection to be proper,
Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 72.1(d)(1) requires
parties to ‘specify the part of the order, proposed
findings, recommendations, or report to which [the party]
objects’ and to ‘state the basis for the
objection.’” Pearce v. Chrysler Group LLC
Pension Plan, 893 F.3d 339, 346 (6th Cir. 2018).
Objections that restate arguments already presented to the
magistrate judge are improper, Coleman-Bey v.
Bouchard, 287 F. App’x 420, 422 (6th Cir. 2008)
(citing Brumley v. Wingard, 269 F.3d 629, 647 (6th
Cir. 2001)), as are those that are vague and dispute the
general correctness of the report and recommendation.
Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995).
objections must be clear so that the district court can
“discern those issues that are dispositive and
contentious.” Id. (citing Howard v.
Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505,
509 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140, 147 (1985) (explaining that objections must go to
“factual and legal” issues “at the heart of
the parties’ dispute”). In sum, Owusu’s
objections must be clear and specific enough to permit the
Court to squarely address them on the merits. See
Pearce, 893 F.3d at 346. Because Owusu is
self-represented, the Court will construe his objections
liberally. See Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387
(6th Cir. 1999) (“Pro se plaintiffs enjoy the benefit
of a liberal construction of their pleadings and