United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING HABEAS PETITION [1],
DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING LEAVE TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
On
September 19, 2019, Kyle Brandon Richards
("Petitioner"), a state prisoner confined at the
Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility in Baraga, Michigan,
filed his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF 1. Petitioner
challenges the Michigan Parole Board's decision to deny
him parole. See Id. at 1. He alleges that the parole
board based its decision on: (1) an "inaccurate and
clearly erroneous offense and conduct evaluation, " (2)
"erroneous and inaccurate statistical guideline scoring,
" and (3) "insufficient and inaccurate mental
health information, " all in violation of his
constitutional rights. Id.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Promptly
after a prisoner files a habeas petition, the Court must
undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine
whether "it plainly appears from the face of the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, Rules
Governing § 2254 Cases. If, after preliminary
consideration, the Court determines that the petition
"should be dismissed for lack of merit on its face,
" the Court has a duty to "screen out" the
petition by dismissing it. Id.; Allen v. Perini, 424
F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970). A Court must dismiss petitions
if they "raise legally frivolous claims" or if they
contain "factual allegations that are palpably
incredible or false." See Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434,
436–37 (6th Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION
I.
Sufficiency of the Habeas Petition
Here,
after undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court
concludes that the petition must be denied. "There is no
constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
sentence." Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and
Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); see also Gavin v. Wells,
914 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1990) ("It is clear that state
prisoners have no federal constitutional right to
parole.") Although the Michigan Parole Board "may
have been required to follow their own procedural statutes
and regulations on parole . . . as a matter of state law,
" there is no "viable legal theory by which
Michigan state authorities are required to follow such
procedural rules as a matter of federal due process."
Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1165 (6th Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (emphasis in original); see also Crump v. Lafler, 657
F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that
"Michigan's 1996 amendments did not affect the
holding in Sweeton" and that there is still "no
'legitimate claim of entitlement to' parole" and
therefore "no liberty interest in parole").
Because
Petitioner has no protected liberty interest in parole, he
cannot establish that the Michigan Parole Board's
decision denying him parole violated his constitutional
rights. Additionally, Petitioner neither alleges nor
establishes that he is being held beyond the expiration of
his sentences. It is clear from the face of his pleading that
he fails to state a claim upon which federal habeas relief
may be granted. The Court must therefore deny the petition.
II.
Potential Civil Rights Claims
The
Court notes that a prisoner may challenge the procedures used
by a parole board to deny him parole under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 after exhausting available state remedies. See Wilkinson
v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82–83 (2005); Thomas v. Eby,
481 F.3d 434, 439–40 (6th Cir. 2007) (plaintiff's
challenge to parole procedures may proceed under § 1983
because it does not automatically imply a shorter sentence).
To the extent that Richards seeks to challenge the parole
procedures and requests a new parole hearing, he must bring
any such claims in a properly-filed civil rights action. The
requirements for pursuing a civil rights action in federal
court differ from those for pursuing a habeas proceeding. For
example, a plaintiff in a civil rights action must pay a
$350.00 filing fee and a $50.00 administrative fee v. a $5.00
filing fee for a habeas action. Petitioner may not circumvent
those requirements by filing a joint or hybrid action.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice any
potential civil rights claims. The Court makes no
determination as to the merits of any such claims.
III.
Certificate of Appealability and Leave to Proceed IFP on
Appeal
Before
Richards may appeal the Court's decision, a certificate
of appealability must issue. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of
appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court denies
relief on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is
met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists
would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claim debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). "A petitioner satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude
the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
327 (2003). When a court denies relief on procedural grounds,
the court should nonetheless issue a certificate of
appealability if "jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petitioner states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right" and "jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the court was correct
in its procedural ruling." Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
Here,
Petitioner fails to make a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right as to his habeas claims or that
jurists of reason would find the Court's procedural
ruling as to any potential civil rights claims debatable. The
Court will therefore deny Petitioner a certificate of
appealability .
Lastly,
the Court concludes that Petitioner should not be allowed to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because an appeal cannot
be ...