United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
R. Grand, Mag. Judge.
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
 AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS 
E. LEVY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Magistrate Judge David R. Grand's Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 24)
recommending that the Court grant Defendant Commissioner of
Social Security's (the “Government”) motion
for summary judgment (ECF No. 23), deny Plaintiff Helena
Munson's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 21), and
affirm the Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ”)
decision. Munson submitted four objections to the R&R
(ECF No. 28), and the Government responded. (ECF No. 31.) For
the reasons set forth below, Munson's objections are
overruled, and the R&R is adopted in full.
Court has carefully reviewed the R&R and is satisfied
that it is a thorough account of the relevant portions of the
record. The factual and procedural background from the
R&R are incorporated as if fully set forth herein.
may object to a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation on dispositive motions, and a district judge
must resolve proper objections under a de novo standard of
review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C); Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b)(1)-(3). “For an objection to be proper, Eastern
District of Michigan Local Rule 72.1(d)(1) requires parties
to specify the part of the order, proposed findings,
recommendations, or report to which [the party] objects and
to state the basis for the objection.” Pearce v.
Chrysler Group LLC Pension Plan, 893 F.3d 339, 346 (6th
Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). Objections that
restate arguments already presented to a magistrate judge are
improper, Coleman-Bey v. Bouchard, 287 Fed.Appx.
420, 422 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Brumley v. Wingard,
269 F.3d 629, 647 (6th Cir. 2001)), as are those that dispute
the general correctness of the report and recommendation.
Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995).
objections must be clear so that the district court can
“discern those issues that are dispositive and
contentious.” Id. (citing Howard v.
Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509
(6th Cir. 1991)); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 147 (1985) (explaining that objections must go to
“factual and legal” issues “at the heart of
the parties' dispute”). In sum, Munson's
objections must be adequately clear and specific so that the
Court can squarely address them on the merits. See
Pearce, 893 F.3d at 346.
Supreme Court recently addressed the standard the district
court must apply when conducting its de novo review. In
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019),
the Court explained that the phrase “substantial
evidence” is a “term of art.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). “Under the
substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing
administrative record and asks whether it contains
‘sufficien[t] evidence' to support the agency's
factual determinations.” Id. (internal
citations omitted). “And whatever the meaning of
‘substantial' in other contexts, the threshold for
such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial
evidence . . . is ‘more than a mere
scintilla.'” Id. (internal citations
omitted). Specifically, “[i]t means-and means
only-'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
first objection, Munson argues that “[t]he Magistrate
Judge incorrectly stated that plaintiff challenges the
ALJ's finding that she engaged in SGA [Substantial
Gainful Activity] ¶ 2011.” (ECF No. 28,
PageID.1663 (citation omitted).) The applicable regulation
provides that a disability is determined through the
application of a five-step sequential analysis. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A). In step
one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”).
Id.; and see Heston v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 245 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R.
forth in the R&R, this case has a lengthy procedural
history and has resulted in four ALJ hearings. The first was
before ALJ Daniel Dadabo, the second and third were before
ALJ Richard Sasena, and the most recent was before ALJ
Anthony Smereka. (Tr. 69-80; 620; 1340; 1365-1417.) In
Munson's motion for summary judgment, she addresses
decisions from ALJ Dadabo and ALJ Sanesa, who both found that
Munson did not engage in SGA during the relevant time period.
(ECF No. 21, PageID.1566.) She contrasts these rulings with
ALJ Smereka's finding that she did engage in SGA during
the relevant time period. (Id.)
essence, Munson argues that the Magistrate Judge was
incorrect in his interpretation of the issues presented in
her memorandum in support of her motion for summary judgment.
Yet, she does not appear to seek de novo review by this
Court-indeed, she did not want this issue analyzed by the
Magistrate Judge in the first place.
relief sought by Munson regarding SGA is vague and the
Magistrate Judge's interpretation of her motion for
summary judgment was reasonable. Thus, Munson's first
objection is overruled.