United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
L. Maloney, United States District Judge.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim
against Defendants Spiker, Theut, and Horton.
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Alger Correctional
Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County, Michigan. The
events about which he complains, however, occurred at the
Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa
County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues URF employees Assistant
Deputy Warden J. Corrigan, Assistant Resident Unit Manager
Unknown Dunton, Resident Unit Manager Corey Spiker, Hearings
Officer Unknown Theut, and Warden Connie Horton.
alleges that on August 14, 2018, he found out that the
Gangster Disciples placed a hit on his life because of a
disagreement he had with one of their members. Plaintiff
walked to the control center and requested protective
custody. The sergeant instructed Plaintiff to write a
statement specifying why he needed protection and from whom.
Plaintiff wrote a letter stating that he had been approached
by a member of the Gangster Disciples who told him that he
needed to pay the gang a monthly fee of $50.00 to stay at the
facility, or else he was going to be seriously hurt. The
sergeant then placed Plaintiff in the “Kory”
August 15, 2018, Plaintiff was taken to a S.C.C. (Security
Classification Committee) meeting. At the meeting, Defendants
Corrigan and Dunton told Plaintiff that he was only asking
for protection so he could be transferred out of URF.
Plaintiff never received a protective custody hearing
investigation. Defendants Corrigan and Dunton told Plaintiff
that unless he returned to general population, they would
keep him in segregation and would write disobeying direct
order tickets on Plaintiff for “refusing general
population” until his points caused him to become a
security level V. Defendants told Plaintiff that once he was
a level V prisoner, they would transfer him. Plaintiff
refused to go to general population and was given a
misconduct ticket. On August 20, 2018, Plaintiff received 10
days in detention.
August 30, 2018, Plaintiff was given another order to return
to the general population. Because Plaintiff was close to
seeing the parole board and did not want any more tickets, he
agreed. Plaintiff was sent to the same unit that housed the
gang members who had threatened him.
September 21, 2018, Plaintiff was attacked from behind while
using the urinal. Plaintiff was struck on the back of his
head multiple times and forced to defend himself. Plaintiff
was taken to health care and was told that he had a fractured
right hand, which required a cast. Plaintiff also had a cut
on his lip. On September 27, 2018, Plaintiff was heard on a
fighting misconduct and again asked for protection.
Plaintiff's request was denied without investigation.
October 23, 2018, Plaintiff had another S.C.C. hearing and
requested protection. Plaintiff's request was denied and
Defendant Corrigan told Plaintiff to stop being scared and to
face his problems. Plaintiff asked Defendant Corrigan if he
wanted Plaintiff to be stabbed next time. On November 2,
2018, Plaintiff was given a direct order to return to general
population. Plaintiff refused because he feared for his life.
As a result, he received a misconduct ticket. On November 7,
2018, Plaintiff received 10 days in detention.
November 17, 2018, Plaintiff refused another direct order to
return to general population and received another misconduct.
On November 20, 2018, Plaintiff was sentenced to 10 days in
detention. Plaintiff was seen by the S.C.C. after each
detention sanction and requested protection each time.
Plaintiff's security level was increased from level II to
level IV because he continued to refuse to return to general
population. On December 26, 2018, Plaintiff was seen by the
S.C.C., where Defendant Corrigan told Plaintiff that he was
requesting to have Plaintiff placed in the “Restart
Program, ” which is for individuals who cannot be
managed in general population.
January 16, 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to LMF and was
placed in segregation. Plaintiff was put in the “Pilot
Program, ” which has 6 stages and lasts a minimum of 10
weeks. Plaintiff was finally released back into general
population on April 2, 2019, and asserts that he was
needlessly punished by confinement in segregation because of
his refusal to go to general population with gang members who
had threatened him. Plaintiff seeks damages.
Failure to State a Claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has