United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
L. MALONEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a civil rights action brought by a federal prisoner claiming
that individuals involved in his federal prosecution violated
his federal constitutional rights. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner
action brought under federal law if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff's
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept
Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint
for failure to state a claim because it is barred by the
doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
is presently incarcerated with the Federal Bureau of Prisons
at the Allenwood Medium Federal Correctional Institution in
White Deer, Pennsylvania. On December 8, 2014, a jury of this
Court found Plaintiff guilty of sexual abuse, aggravated
sexual abuse, assault resulting in serious bodily injury,
domestic assault, and attempt to tamper with a victim by
corrupt persuasion. On May 11, 2015, the Court imposed
concurrent sentences on each count. The longest of
Plaintiff's concurrent sentences is 355 months.
Plaintiff, with the assistance of counsel, directly appealed
his convictions. By judgment entered February 3, 2017, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's
judgment. Plaintiff then filed a petition for writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court denied the petition on June 6, 2017.
exhausting his direct appeal, Plaintiff returned to this
Court and filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. By opinion, order, and judgment
entered August 3, 2018, the Court denied relief and denied
Plaintiff a certificate of appealability. Plaintiff then
sought a certificate of appealability from the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. That court denied the certificate by order
entered October 31, 2018.
21, 2019, Plaintiff moved the Court to produce his grand jury
hearing transcripts, ballot, or record, the indictment, and
the criminal complaint. That motion remains pending. On July
22, 2019, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action.
sues Jeff J. Davis and Hannah N. Bobee from the United States
Attorneys Office; arresting agent Richard Grout; court
reporters K. Thomas, Sandy Larson, and Glenda Trexler;
Richard Barr from the Department of Justice; Unknown Party #1
described as head of the Bureau of Prisons; Unknown Party #2
described as Probation Officer; and Judge R. Allan Edgar.
Plaintiff does not identify specific actions taken by each
Defendant; rather, he refers to them collectively:
The aforementioned defendants are legally responsible for
violating the plaintiff's due process rights, depriving
him of any substantive due process as stipulated for in the
Fourteenth Amendment, affecting his liberty interest to be
free from prosecution without probable cause, and for placing
him in custody unlawfully.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1-2.) The crux of Plaintiff's
complaint is that he was wrongfully convicted and, now, is
“unlawfully and unconstitutionally” confined.
(Id., PageID.1.) Plaintiff seeks the documents he
requested by motion in his criminal case so that he might
prove the denial of due process. He asks the Court to award
him nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages. Plaintiff
also asks the Court to order his immediate release from
custody “thereby terminating his fraudulent sentence
and probation.” (Id., PageID.2.)
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
person alleges that a “federal” actor has
violated his or her federal constitutional rights, the claim
arises under the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Plaintiff invokes Bivens as the basis for his
claims.(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 3.) The Court
will consider Plaintiff's allegations as attempting to
state a Bivens claim.
Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, the Supreme Court recognized
for the first time an implied private action for damages
against federal officers alleged to have violated a
citizen's constitutional rights. See Corr. Servs.
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). This implied
cause of action is “the federal analog to suits brought
against state officials” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006). To
state a claim that is cognizable in a Bivens action,
the plaintiff must plead two essential elements: first, that
he has been deprived of ...