United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
T. NEFF, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Michigan Reformatory (RMI) in
Ionia, Michigan, where he is serving two life sentences for
two convictions of first-degree murder. Plaintiff sues J.
Thomas, a Resident Unit Manager (RUM) at RMI.
alleges that he was housed at the Kinross Correctional
Facility (KCF) when a “major disturbance” among
prisoners took place in the KCF prison yard on September 10,
2016. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) He transferred to RMI
three days later and received a class I misconduct ticket for
rioting or striking, based on his alleged involvement in the
disturbance. Prison officials placed him in temporary
segregation until his misconduct hearing.
Marutiak held a hearing on the misconduct ticket on September
14 and found Plaintiff not guilty because there was no
credible evidence to support the assertion that Plaintiff
participated in the disturbance at KCF. However, Marutiak
charged Plaintiff with a class II misconduct for being out of
place. Plaintiff contends that he did not receive adequate
notice of this charge prior to the hearing.
transferred to the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) on
October 5, 2016, where he was again placed in segregation. On
October 11, Plaintiff received a notice of intent to conduct
an administrative hearing (NOI),  written by Defendant Thomas.
Plaintiff contends that Thomas deliberately misrepresented
facts in the NOI.
October 13, Hearing Officer Burke allegedly dismissed the NOI
because the evidence did not support it. That same day,
Defendant Thomas allegedly prepared a second NOI falsely
claiming that Plaintiff was involved in the disturbance at
KCF because he was not on his bunk at the time. Plaintiff
contends that he was deprived of due process because the NOI
was not reviewed within 24 hours, in accordance with the
prison policy. In any event, Hearing Officer Burke found
Plaintiff guilty of the charge in the second NOI.
successfully appealed the guilty finding. On January 25,
2017, a Hearings Administrator allegedly dismissed the second
NOI because it was false.
claims that Defendant Thomas intentionally falsified the NOIs
to retaliate against Plaintiff and to have him placed in
segregation because Thomas believed that Plaintiff was
involved in the disturbance at KCF. Plaintiff argues that
Thomas' actions violated Plaintiff's rights under the
First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
relief, Plaintiff seeks an injunction and damages.
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has