United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
L. MALONEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read
Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are
clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff
fails to state a federal claim, and the Court declines to
exercise jurisdiction over any claims arising under state
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Central Michigan Correctional
Facility (STF) in St. Louis, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the
following employees of the MDOC: Director Heidi Washington,
Deputy Director Richard Marlan, Parole Board Chairman Michael
Eagen, and Hearings Officer Maribeth Zeller.
alleges that, in 2017, while he was on parole, he was charged
with a violation of his parole. Defendant Zeller conducted a
parole violation hearing on August 24, 2017, and determined
that Plaintiff had violated his parole. About a month later,
two members of the Parole Board, Sandra Wilson and Sonya
Warchok, decided to revoke Plaintiff's parole. That same
day, nine members of the Parole Board decided to continue
Plaintiff's imprisonment for 60 months. According to the
Parole Board's notice of decision, only part of which is
attached to the complaint, board members Wilson and Warchok
revoked Plaintiff parole because he was guilty of the
following parole violation:
On or about 07/07/17 you engaged in behavior that was
assaultive, abusive, threatening and/or intimidating by
making threats against Agent Robinson and his family.
(MDOC Parole Board Notice of Action, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.66.)
contends that Defendants authorized policies and procedures
that permitted the revocation of his parole without following
the requirements of state law and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. For instance, Plaintiff contends
that he did not receive a “written summary” of
the evidence against him before his parole violation hearing,
and the parole board did not provide “good cause”
for the revocation in writing or on the record, which he
contends are requirements under state law and Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). In addition, only two
members of the Parole Board made the decision to revoke his
parole, but Plaintiff contends that state law requires a
majority of a panel of three members to make this decision.
relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants
violated his rights and an injunction requiring a new parole
violation hearing with the proper procedures.
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
42 U.S.C. § 1983
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action ...