United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Petitioner William Hudson's
(“Petitioner”) pro se petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner challenges his convictions for carjacking, assault
with intent to commit murder, and felony firearm. The Court
reviewed the petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 cases in the United States District Courts. On
August 12, 2019, the Court directed Hudson to show cause why
his petition should not be dismissed as time-barred under the
applicable one-year statute of limitations. ECF No. 2.
Petitioner responded to the Court's Show Cause Order on
October 1, 2019. ECF No. 4. For the reasons set forth below,
this Court will dismiss the petition as untimely.
a jury trial in Wayne County Circuit Court, Petitioner was
convicted and sentenced as follows: 10 years, 10 months to 45
years for the assault and carjacking convictions, to be
served concurrently with one another and consecutively to 2
years for the felony-firearm conviction. The Michigan Court
of Appeals affirmed his convictions on direct appeal.
People v. Hudson, No. 247706, 2004 WL 2291320 (Mich.
Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004). The Michigan Supreme Court then
denied leave to appeal. People v. Hudson, No.
127550, 472 Mich. 939 (June 28, 2005).
December 20, 2016, Petitioner filed a Motion for Relief from
Judgment. The trial court denied the motion. See
1/24/2017 Order (ECF No. 1, PageID.57). The Michigan Court of
Appeals denied his application for leave to appeal.
People v. Hudson, No. 339350 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept.
14, 2017). On July 27, 2018, the Michigan Supreme Court also
denied leave to appeal. People v. Hudson, No.
156752, 502 Mich. 936 (July 27, 2018).
25, 2019, Petitioner filed the instant petition. ECF No.
LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, applies to all habeas
petitions filed after its effective date, April 24, 1996. It
imposes a one-year limitations period for all habeas
petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A
prisoner must file a federal habeas corpus petition within
one year of the “date on which the judgment became
final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of
the time for seeking such review . . . or the date on which
the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), (D). The
time during which a prisoner seeks state-court collateral
review of a conviction does not count toward the limitation
period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Ege v. Yukins,
485 F.3d 364, 371B72 (6th Cir. 2007). A properly filed
application for state post-conviction relief, while tolling
the limitation period, does not reset the limitation period
at zero. Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 602 (6th
Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's application
for leave to appeal on June 28, 2005. Because Petitioner did
not petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court, his conviction became final on September 26,
2005, when the time period for seeking certiorari expired.
See Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir.
2000) (one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari
for direct review in the United States Supreme Court has
expired). The limitations period commenced the following day,
September 27, 2005, and continued to run, uninterrupted,
until it expired 365-days later, on September 27, 2006.
See Id. (one-year limitations period commences the
day after the expiration of the 90-day period for filing a
petition for a writ of certiorari).
filed his habeas petition on July 22, 2019, almost 13 years
after the limitations period expired. His Motion for Relief
from Judgment did not toll the limitations period because he
filed the motion on December 20, 2016--over ten years after
the limitations period expired. Vroman, 346 F.3d at
602 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the filing of a motion for
collateral review in state court serves to
“pause” the clock, not restart it). The petition,
therefore, is untimely unless the limitations period is
AEDPA's one-year limitations period is not a
jurisdictional bar and is therefore subject to equitable
tolling where a habeas petitioner “shows (1) that he
has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented
timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S.
631, 649 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner argues in the instant case that he is entitled to
equitable tolling of the limitations period based upon his
petitioner's mental incompetence can constitute an
extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling of
the one-year limitations period. Ata v. Scutt, 662
F.3d 736, 742 (6th Cir. 2011). In Ata, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that in order to be entitled to
equitable tolling for mental incompetence, the petitioner
must show that he was mentally incompetent and that his
incompetence caused the late filing. Id. at 742. The
petitioner must show “a causal link between the mental
condition and untimely filing.” Id. A mental
impairment “'might justify equitable tolling if it
interferes with the ability to understand the need for
assistance, the ability to secure it, or the ability to
cooperate with or monitor assistance'” once
obtained. Stiltner v. Hart, 657 Fed.Appx. 513, 521
(6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d
1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010)).
here fails to satisfy this standard. He states he suffers
from “major depression, which interfered with his
ability to understand the need for assistance, the ability to
secure it, and the ability to cooperate with or monitor
assistance once obtained.” Pet'r's Resp. to
Show Cause Order at 1 (ECF No. 4, PageID.96). In support of
his claim, he submits two reports, dated September 4, 2015,
and October 23, 2015, prepared by the MDOC Bureau of Health
Care Services, in connection with mental health treatment he
has received. Both reports indicate that Petitioner suffered
from depression and difficulty with impulse control at the
time he was evaluated and prior to that time. The reports
also show that he received counseling and medication for his
symptoms. Petitioner presents no evidence that he continued
to suffer from mental illness after October 2015.
Petitioner presents no evidence that his mental illness
caused his failure to file a timely petition. In fact, in
2007 and 2008, he filed two civil rights complaints in
federal court. See Hudson v. Phillipson, No.
2:07-cv-00138 (W.D. Mich.); Hudson v. Michigan Department
of Corrections, et al., No. 2:08-cv-00208 (W.D. Mich.).
A petitioner's ability to file other pleadings is
relevant to whether there is a causal connection between a
petitioner's mental condition and the ability to file a
timely habeas petition. See Bilbrey v. Douglas, 124
Fed.Appx. 971, 973 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding equitable tolling
unavailable where petitioner, although experiencing
“continuing mental health problems, ” continued
to litigate in the state court); Price v. Lewis, 119
Fed.Appx. 725, 726 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The exceptional
circumstances that would justify ...