United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
J. QUIST UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Larry Fuller, proceeding pro se, filed a sixteen-count
Complaint against Defendants, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(Chase); Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO of Chase; Schneiderman
& Sherman, P.C.; Marsha Sanderson; and Trott Law, in the
Kalamazoo County Circuit Court on or about May 17, 2019,
alleging numerous claims based on federal and state law. On
June 17, 2019, Defendants JP Morgan and Dimon removed the
case to this Court, alleging the existence of both federal
question and diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) All of
Fuller's claims arise out of Chase's nonjudicial
foreclosure of a mortgage on Fuller's real property. On
August 7, 2019, the Court dismissed Count 16 of the
complaint-which alleged that Defendants violated the
automatic stay provision of the United States Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362-for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No.
Morgan, Schneiderman & Sherman, and Trott Law have filed
motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In addition,
Defendant Dimon has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Fuller has failed to respond to Defendants'
motions with the time provided under Western District of
Michigan Local Civil Rule 7.2(c).
reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants'
motions and dismiss the Complaint with prejudice. In
addition, the Court will deny Fuller's motion for a
temporary restraining order.
following facts are based on the allegations in Fuller's
Complaint, the documents attached to the Complaint, matters
of public record, and exhibits attached to Defendants'
motions and briefs that are referred to in the
March 19, 2003, Fuller obtained a mortgage loan from Bank
One, N.A. in the amount of $303, 500, to purchase real
property known as 530 West South Street, Kalamazoo, Michigan
49007 (Property). (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.16; ECF No. 21-1 at
PageID.395.) Fuller granted a mortgage (Mortgage) on the
Property to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
(MERS) to secure repayment of the loan. (ECF No. 21-1 at
PageID.395.) On or about April 3, 2012, MERS assigned the
Mortgage to Chase, and the assignment was recorded in the
Kalamazoo County Register of Deeds as instrument number
2012-010402. (Id. at PageID.411.)
point, Fuller defaulted on his loan. On October 3, 2015,
Fuller entered into a Loan Modification Agreement (LMA) with
Chase, which provided that the new principal balance for the
loan was $395, 942.91. (Id. at PageID.413-14.) The
LMA was recorded with the Kalamazoo County Register of Deeds
on December 19, 2013, as instrument number 2013-049798.
Eventually, Fuller defaulted on his obligations under the
loan and the LMA, and Chase, through its counsel,
Schneiderman & Sherman, P.C., initiated a foreclosure by
advertisement. (Id. at 21-1 at PageID.420.) The
Property was initially noticed for a July 12, 2018,
sheriff's sale, and notice of the sale was published for
four consecutive weeks in The Climax Crescent,
beginning on June 8, 2018. (Id. at PageID.422.) The
sale was postponed but was ultimately held on October 18,
2018. (ECF Id. at PageID.421.) Chase purchased the
Property at the sheriff's sale. (Id. at
PageID.420-21.) Fuller's right of redemption expired on
April 19, 2019, pursuant to M.C.L. § 600.3238.
to the foreclosure, Fuller filed several Chapter 13
bankruptcy petitions. He filed the first on May 12, 2017.
That case was dismissed on June 16, 2017. (Id. at
PageID.433.) Fuller filed his second Chapter 13 petition on
June 27, 2017. That case was dismissed on November 14, 2017.
(Id. at PageID.454.) Fuller filed his third Chapter
13 petition on January 26, 2018, which was dismissed on May
4, 2018. (Id. at PageID.479.) Fuller filed his
fourth Chapter 13 petition on March 18, 2019. The bankruptcy
court dismissed that case on June 5, 2019, and barred Fuller
from filing another bankruptcy case until November 26, 2020.
(Id. at PageID.98-99.)
filed the instant case in Kalamazoo County Circuit Court on
or about May 17, 2019, approximately 28 days after the
redemption period expired. Fuller alleges that he sought a
loan modification from Chase but that Chase denied his
request for loss mitigation assistance and, instead,
initiated the foreclosure sale. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.21.)
Elsewhere, Fuller alleges that although he is “in
active loan modification review, ” Chase wrongfully
proceeded with the foreclosure. (Id. at PageID.18,
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds'
of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 1964-65 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957)). The court must accept
all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466
(6th Cir. 2009). The court must determine whether the
complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Although the
plausibility standard is not equivalent to a
“‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Id. at 1950 (quoting
law argues in its motion that it is entitled to dismissal
because it had nothing to do with the foreclosure. Trott Law
states that its first encounter with the incidents and
transactions alleged in the Complaint was when it received a
copy of the Complaint. Trott Law notes that Fuller alleges no
fact suggesting that Trott Law was involved in the
foreclosure in any capacity or respect or engaged in any
wrongdoing. The Court agrees. Fuller's allegations, as
well as the publicly available documents pertaining to the
foreclosure, show that Trott Law was not involved at all in
the foreclosure. The pertinent documents show that
Schneiderman & Sherman, not Trott Law, handled the
foreclosure sale for Chase. Accordingly, Trott Law is
entitled to dismissal as Fuller alleges no basis to impose
liability on this Defendant. Cf. Gilmore v. Corrs. Corp.
of Am., 92 Fed.Appx. 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“Merely listing names in the caption of the complaint
and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the
complaint is not enough to sustain recovery under §
Defendant Sanderson has not moved for dismissal, the
Court's review of the Complaint shows that Fuller alleges
no fact against her that could support a claim under any of
the theories that Fuller alleges. Fuller's only
allegation regarding Sanderson is that she is employed by
Schneiderman & Sanderson and that, in an October 2, 2018
telephone call, she told Fuller that Chase and Schneiderman
& Sherman were not auctioning his home and “the
on-line advertisement ‘Live Auction: Oct. 04, 10:00am
[sic]' at auction.com is not correct.” (ECF No. 1-1
at PageID.20.) Such statement was true, as no auction or sale
occurred on October 4, 2018. Moreover, Fuller fails to allege
how Sanderson's alleged statement amounts to wrongful
Dimon moves for dismissal because the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over him. Dimon argues that Fuller fails to
allege any facts showing that Dimon has sufficient contacts
with the State of Michigan to render the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court proper. In particular, Dimon
argues that Fuller fails to show that Dimon, a New York
resident, has any personal contacts with the State of
Michigan or was personally involved with Fuller's loan or
the foreclosure. (ECF No. 20 at PageID.246.)
noted, Fuller has failed to respond to Dimon's motion
within the prescribed time. Some courts have noted that,
where, as here, a nonmoving party fails to timely respond to
a dispositive motion, such failure could be considered a
failure to prosecute, allowing for dismissal on that basis
alone. See e.g., Cruz v. Bank of Am., No.
12-11148, 2012 WL 2849419, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 11, 2012).
Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed Dimon's motion and
concludes that he has properly supported his motion. That is,
Dimon has shown that this Court has neither general
jurisdiction nor limited jurisdiction over Dimon pursuant to
Michigan's long-arm statutes. See M.C.L.
§§ 600.701, 600.705. Moreover, Fuller fails to show
that Dimon has “certain minimum contacts with [the
forum] such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'” Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 C. St. 154, 158 (1945)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61
S.Ct. 339, 343 (1940)). In short, Fuller has failed to come
forth with facts showing that this Court has personal