United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
JACOB A. FAWFAW, Plaintiff,
UNKNOWN TIGHE et al., Defendants.
L. MALONEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim
against Defendant Grievance Coordinator Unknown Party #1 and
the claim against Defendant Corrections Officer Unknown Tighe
for deprivation of property without due process.
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in
Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. The events about which
he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues
Corrections Officers Unknown Tighe, Unknown Pieczynsky, and
Unknown Bissel; Grievance Coordinator Unknown Party #1; and
Registered Nurse Unknown Party #2.
alleges that on the afternoon of June 25, 2019, he was about
to start his sanction break in the morning yard of ECF when
two corrections officers ordered Plaintiff to “cuff
up” to return to segregation. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.2-3.) Plaintiff refused and requested a sergeant or
shift commanding officer for an explanation. (Id.,
PageID.3.) In response to Plaintiff's failure to comply
with the direct order, Defendants Tighe and Pieczynsky
“pulled a Tazer [sic] on the Plaintiff and threatened
to use deadly force.” (Id.)
Tighe and Pieczynsky escorted Plaintiff to segregation with
hands cuffed behind his back and raised such that Plaintiff
suffered pain to his shoulder and neck. (Id.,
PageID.2.) When Plaintiff informed Defendants Tighe and
Pieczynsky of the pain and his preexisting neck injury,
Defendant Tighe pulled Plaintiff's arms up further behind
his back and directed Plaintiff to “Shut the fuck up,
and stop being a bitch.” (Id.) Defendant Tighe
subsequently destroyed Plaintiff's headphones by ripping
the earbuds from the cords. (Id.)
Plaintiff and Defendants Tighe and Pieczynsky entered the
segregation unit, Plaintiff again informed that they were
causing pain to his neck. (Id.) In response,
Defendant Tighe “grabbed the Plaintiff by his throat
and squeezed his windpipe . . . choking [him].”
(Id.) In a similar fashion, Defendant Pieczynsky
then “shoved his knuckles into the Plaintiff[']s
ear, neck, and throat” such that both Defendants Tighe
and Pieczynsky were applying force to
“Plaintiff[']s throat and choking” him.
(Id.) Soon thereafter, Defendants Tighe and
Pieczynsky shoved Plaintiff's head and face against the
segregation unit's inside door, and Defendant Pieczynsky
“punched the plaintiff in his side one time”
before placing Plaintiff in a cell. (Id.)
alleges he is mentally ill and receives treatment for mood
disorders and depression. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff
alleges that while in the cell he experienced pain and
symptoms of depression following the incidents with
Defendants Tighe and Pieczynsky. (Id.) To address
these symptoms, Plaintiff informed Defendant Bissel that he
was having suicidal thoughts and needed a nurse.
(Id.) Defendant Bissel responded that he did not
care and that he was going home. (Id.) Approximately
15 minutes later, Plaintiff attempted suicide by cutting open
his arm. (Id.) A shift commander was alerted, but
Plaintiff's complaint does not otherwise describe the
days later, on June 27, 2019, Plaintiff sent a medical kite
to Defendant Registered Nurse Unknown Party #2, which was
never answered, seeking treatment for the neck and throat
pains caused by Defendants Tighe and Pieczynsky.
(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that staff continue to
retaliate against him, including by failing to respond to his
medical kites or to respond to his grievances. (Id.)
Failure to State a Claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims against all
defendants under theories of excessive force, failure to
protect, and deprivation of medical care. Plaintiff's
statement of the facts additionally implies a claim against
Defendant Tighe under the ...