United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION
PAUL
L. MALONEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This is
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional
Facility (JCF) in Jackson, Jackson County, Michigan. The
events about which he complains, however, occurred at the
Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF) in Coldwater, Branch
County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Defendant Assistant Resident
Unit Manager Amy E. Houtz.
Plaintiff
alleges that on December 12, 2018, he received a case
management order and notice of a telephone settlement
conference in No. 1:16-cv-585. The settlement conference was
scheduled before United States Magistrate Judge Ellen S.
Carmody on February 22, 2019, at 1400 hours. Plaintiff was to
attend the conference in the designated area at LCF, however
Defendant Houtz made a change in the arrangement so the
conference would be held in Defendant Houtz's office.
Prior to the beginning of the teleconference, Plaintiff asked
Defendant Houtz if she could excuse herself from the room
during the conference. Defendant Houtz became angry and
stated:
I told you back in November that I was not going to be
assisting you or whoever this Amy Harwath [Plaintiff's
attorney in No. 1:16-cv-585] is with any type of civil
litigation or permitting anything else against any of my
fellow officials. So since it seems that I keep on getting
involve[d] in your issues I could really care less about
violating your confidential communication with your attorney
or the courts and I am going to fix this problem very
shortly.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) Defendant Houtz did in fact stay
during the settlement conference. Four days later, Defendant
Houtz submitted a “fraudulent” security
classification review screen on Plaintiff, setting in motion
a retaliatory transfer to another prison. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
III.
Retaliation
Plaintiff
claims that Defendant Houtz retaliated against him for his
lawsuit when he asked her to leave the office during his
settlement conference. Retaliation based upon a
prisoner's exercise of his or her constitutional rights
violates the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v.
Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In
order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a
plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was engaged in
protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against
him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from
engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was
motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct.
Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove that
the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or
motivating factor in the defendant's alleged retaliatory
conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037
(6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
Plaintiff's
action in filing a lawsuit is protected conduct for purposes
of a retaliation claim. Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d
594, 607 (6th Cir. 2002). However, Plaintiff fails to meet
the second prong in Thaddeus-X because he does not
allege facts showing that an adverse action was taken against
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