United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [19]
Nancy
G. Edmunds, United States District Judge.
This
civil rights lawsuit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 arises out of Plaintiff Bruce Grant's arrest on
April 20, 2016. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officers
Roland Frederick, Kenneth Valrie, and Kevin Treasvant
(collectively referred to as “Defendants”)
violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution when they
conducted an unlawful search and seizure of his person. The
matter is now before the Court on Defendants' motion for
summary judgment. (Dkt. 19.) Defendants argue that they are
entitled to qualified immunity, and that they conducted a
lawful investigatory stop. Plaintiff filed a response
opposing the motion, (dkt. 21), and Defendants filed a reply,
(dkt. 22). The Court held a hearing on the motion on October
30, 2019. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES
Defendants' motion.
I.
Background
On
April 20, 2016, Defendants were on patrol in a marked scout
car as a part of the Detroit Police Department's gang
intelligence unit. Plaintiff was walking northbound on
Rutland Street in Detroit, and Defendants were heading
westbound on Elmira toward Rutland. According to Plaintiff,
when he reached the stop sign, he looked up from his phone
and saw a white van followed by a police vehicle and another
vehicle. (Dkt. 21-2, PgID 160-61.) He turned left onto Elmira
and continued his walk towards the gas station on Southfield
and Plymouth, but was cut off by a City of Detroit scout car.
(Id.) A second police car also stopped. Defendant
Officer Frederick exited the car and conducted a pat down of
Plaintiff. A gun was found in Plaintiff's right
waistband. Because Plaintiff did not have a concealed pistol
license, he was placed under arrest and later charged in
state court with carrying a concealed weapon.
Plaintiff
filed a motion to suppress the evidence in the state court
case and argued that the stop was unlawful. Defendant
Frederick testified at the motion to suppress hearing that
Plaintiff was initially walking normally but when he saw the
officers, he stopped, grabbed his right waistband, and then
continued a couple of steps before turning and walking away
at a faster pace than he was walking previously. (Dkt. 21-3,
PgID 185-86.) Defendant Frederick then discussed his
observations with Defendants Valrie and Treasvant and they
agreed that Plaintiff's behavior was consistent with that
of an individual attempting to conceal a gun. The state court
reasoned that Plaintiff turning around, dropping his arm, and
walking in a different direction did not constitute
reasonable suspicion, and, thus, granted the motion to
suppress. (Dkt. 21-9, PgID 255.) The charge against Plaintiff
was therefore dismissed. (Id. at PgID 256.)
II.
Legal Standard
It is
well established that summary judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 is proper when “‘the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.'” United States S.E.C. v. Sierra Brokerage
Servs., Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 326-27 (6th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). When reviewing the record,
“‘the court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in its favor.'” Id.
at 327 (quoting Tysinger v. Police Dep't of
Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Furthermore, the “‘substantive law will identify
which facts are material,' and ‘summary judgment
will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine,
that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'”
Id. at 327 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When considering the
material facts on the record, a court must bear in mind that
“[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient;
there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably
find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
252.
III.
Analysis
Defendants
argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because
they did not violate Plaintiff's right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment.[1] Plaintiff responds by arguing that taking
the facts in the light most favorable to him, there was a
Fourth Amendment violation.
A.
Qualified Immunity Generally
Government
officials are entitled to qualified immunity where their
actions do not “violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Green v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101,
1104 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A government official “will
not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that
no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that
[the action at issue was lawful]; but if officers of
reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity
should be recognized.” Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Qualified immunity is an initial
threshold question the court is required to rule on early in
the proceeding so that the costs and expenses of trial are
avoided where the defense is dispositive. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Qualified immunity is
“an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other
burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The privilege is “an immunity
from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like
an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id.
The
first inquiry to determine qualified immunity is whether,
taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the
injury, the facts alleged show the official's conduct
violated a constitutional right. Siegert v. Giley,
500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). If no constitutional right would
have been violated, there is no need for further inquiries
concerning qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at
201. If a violation could be made out, the next step is to
determine whether the right was clearly established in light
of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition. Id. The “clearly
established” right allegedly violated by the officials
cannot be considered at an abstract level, but must be
approached at a level of specificity: “The contours of
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
639 (1987). “Reasonableness” is a question of law
to be decided by the trial court.
B.
Fourth Amendment Claim
Defendants
argue that they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because
they conducted a lawful Terry investigatory stop.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not have the ...