United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT VASILIS POZIOS'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 71]
Victoria A. Roberts, United States District Judge.
Paul Kinchloe (“Kinchloe”), a state inmate,
brings this deliberate indifference claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. He claims that Michigan Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”) employees, including
Defendant Vasilis Pozios (“Pozios”), forced him
to participate in a mental health program and take
psychotropic drugs against his will. He claims this was
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and violated
his Eighth Amendment rights.
is a MDOC psychiatrist who treated Kinchloe in a mental
health program. In his motion for summary judgment, Pozios
says Kinchloe did not exhaust available administrative
remedies through the MDOC grievance procedure, and the suit
is barred pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Court GRANTS Pozios's motion for summary
judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). There is a genuine dispute of a material fact
“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence
as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.” Kochins v. Linden Alimak,
Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986).
moving party has the initial burden to demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden
then shifts to the nonmoving party to show a genuine issue of
material fact. Id.
did not respond to Pozios's motion for summary judgment.
However, “a district court cannot grant summary
judgment in favor of a movant simply because the adverse
party has not responded.” Carver v. Bunch, 946
F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir.1991). The moving party must still
meet its initial burden. Pozios does that.
says Kinchloe did not exhaust administrative remedies.
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires
that inmates exhaust administrative remedies before filing
suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory for
all actions surrounding prison conditions. Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). “Proper
exhaustion” is necessary, meaning inmates must follow
the administrative procedure of the pertinent facility.
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2006).
to exhaust is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Pozios pleads it here.
MDOC grievance policy has exhaustion requirements. [ECF No.
61-2, PageID.305-08] The inmate must first attempt to resolve
the grievance informally with staff. If this is not
successful, the inmate may proceed to Step I and file an
official grievance form with the Grievance Coordinator. If
the inmate is not satisfied with the resolution of Step I,
Step II is to file a ...