United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS EYKE AND DAVIS'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 61]
Victoria A. Roberts, United States District Judge.
Paul Kinchloe (“Kinchloe”), a state inmate,
brings this deliberate indifference claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. He claims that Michigan Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”) employees, including Paul
Eyke and Tish Walt Davis (“Defendants”), forced
him to participate in a mental health program and take
psychotropic drugs against his will. He claims this was
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and violated
his Eighth Amendment rights.
move for summary judgment. In their motion, they say Kinchloe
did not exhaust available administrative remedies through the
MDOC grievance procedure, and the suit is barred pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for
judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). There is a genuine dispute of a material fact
“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence
as well as all inferences drawn therefrom must be read in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.” Kochins v. Linden Alimak,
Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986).
moving party has the initial burden to demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden
then shifts to the nonmoving party to show a genuine issue of
material fact. Id.
did not respond to Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. However, “a district court cannot grant
summary judgment in favor of a movant simply because the
adverse party has not responded.” Carver v.
Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir.1991). The moving
party must still meet its initial burden. Defendants do that.
say Kinchloe did not exhaust administrative remedies.
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires
that inmates exhaust administrative remedies before filing in
court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory for
all actions surrounding prison conditions. Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). “Proper
exhaustion” is necessary, meaning the inmate must
follow the administrative procedure of the pertinent
facility. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-94
to exhaust is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Defendants plead it here.
MDOC grievance policy has exhaustion requirements. [ECF No.
61-2, PageID.305-08] The inmate must first attempt to resolve
the grievance informally with staff. If this is not
successful, the inmate may proceed to Step I and file an
official grievance form with the Grievance Coordinator. If
the inmate is not satisfied with the resolution of Step I,
Step II ...