United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
OPINION
JANET
T. NEFF, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This is
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Saginaw County Correctional
Facility (SRF) in Freeland, Saginaw County, Michigan. The
events about which he complains, however, occurred at the
Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County,
Michigan. Plaintiff sues MDOC Housing Unit Officers K.
Mattson, H. Beckwith, and J. Haleal.
Plaintiff
is a non-ambulatory, disabled prisoner who uses a wheelchair.
He alleges that in early July 2018, he notified Defendant
Mattson that “the water from Plaintiff['s] shower
was dangerously unsafe and flooding all over his cell.”
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) Defendant Mattson
“failed to provide Plaintiff and his aide with
appropriate cleaning supplies” and otherwise ignored
Plaintiff's warning about the conditions of the shower
during the subsequent days. (Id., PageID.9.) On July
15, 2018, Plaintiff fell while attempting to use his shower
during the early morning hours, knocking his head and losing
consciousness. (Id., PageID.7.)
Plaintiff
apparently was not discovered for some time while he lay on
the floor of his cell, semi-conscious and amidst water and
raw sewage. He alleges that Defendants Haleal and Beckwith,
who both work third shift, failed to notice Plaintiff on the
floor while conducting their regular cell checks. Plaintiff
was eventually discovered and taken to the LMF Health Care
Center to receive treatment. He had painful facial wounds
that continue to disrupt his sleep. Plaintiff further alleges
that, on July 15, 2018, presumably upon learning of
Plaintiff's incident and condition, Defendant Mattson
“laughed and said ‘no one deserves to live in
shit more than [Plaintiff].'” (Id.,
PageID.9.)
Plaintiff
seeks declaratory judgment as well as compensatory and
punitive damages.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Here,
Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims against all three
defendants under a theory of deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff also asserts a gross negligence claim under state
law against all three defendants.
A.
Eighth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff
alleges Defendant Mattson was deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff's health and safety because he ignored
Plaintiff's warnings about the conditions of his shower,
leading to Plaintiff's fall and injuries. Plaintiff
further alleges that Defendants Haleal and Beckwith were
deliberately indifferent to his health ...