In re R. E. WHITE, II, Minor.
R. E. WHITE, II, Respondent-Appellant. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Petitioner-Appellee,
Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2015-836585-DL
Before: Riordan, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Cameron, JJ.
pleaded no contest and was adjudicated responsible for
unlawful driving away of an automobile (UDAA), MCL 750.413,
and driving while license suspended, MCL 257.904(1). The
trial court entered an order of disposition that placed
respondent in Children's Village. After a hearing,
respondent was ordered to pay a total of $1, 774.25 in
restitution. Respondent appeals by leave
granted solely challenging the restitution order.
We vacate the restitution order and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
about January 4, 2017, respondent stole a 2008 Ford Escape
belonging to the victim, Christopher Giarmo, from his
residence. The police returned Giarmo's vehicle to him
five or six days after the theft. Giarmo kept his vehicle in
"pristine" condition. When it was returned to him,
the contents of the glove box were strewn about the vehicle,
the interior smelled of smoke, the interior was coated in
dust because of the police attempt to lift fingerprints, and
an extra key fob kept hidden in a false bottom of the
vehicle's center console was missing.
his vehicle was returned, Giarmo paid $154 to have the
vehicle professionally cleaned to remove the smell and the
fingerprint dust. Additionally, he expended $98.88 to replace
his car keys. This cost included the replacement of the
electronic key fob that Giarmo had in his possession as well
as the hidden key fob that was taken from the vehicle's
center console. These new key fobs were the only keys
programmed to electronically lock, unlock, and start
Giarmo's vehicle. However, the missing key could still be
used to physically lock, unlock, and start his
vehicle. In order to prevent an individual from using the
missing key to enter, start, and drive the vehicle away,
Giarmo obtained an estimate of $1, 521.37 to replace his
vehicle's locks and ignition. Giarmo's insurance
company refused to reimburse for this replacement because the
cylinders were not damaged during the theft. Giarmo testified
that he did not feel safe with the original key fob still
missing. He opined that he could not securely lock
items in his vehicle, and someone could unlock the vehicle
and lay in wait to prey upon his wife. Giarmo determined that
his vehicle had an estimated value of $5500, but he still
owed approximately $6, 000. Because it was not cost effective
to replace the vehicle's locks and ignition in light of
the balance owed, Giarmo elected to turn his vehicle in to a
dealership and lease a new vehicle. At the restitution
hearing, the trial judge ordered respondent to pay $1, 774.25
in restitution to Giarmo. This restitution payment included
the costs of replacing the key fobs and the professional
cleaning that were incurred, but also included the cost of
replacing the locks and the ignition that had not been
expended. The trial court justified "the additional
amount of the $1, 521.37 [in restitution] with regard to the
cylinder repair that was incurred in the fashion of having to
get a new car."
RESTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAW
victims have a right to restitution under both the Michigan
Constitution and Michigan statutory law." People v
Wahmhoff, 319 Mich.App. 264, 269; 900 N.W.2d 364 (2017).
"The purpose of restitution is to allow crime victims to
recoup losses suffered as a result of criminal conduct."
People v Newton, 257 Mich.App. 61, 68; 665 N.W.2d
504 (2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Restitution is not designed to provide a windfall for crime
victims, but was created to ensure that victims are made
whole for their losses to the extent possible. People v
Corbin, 312 Mich.App. 352, 370; 880 N.W.2d 2 (2015). The
juvenile code, MCL 712A.30 and MCL 712A.31, utilizes the same
statutory scheme for restitution that was delineated in the
Crime Victim's Rights Act (CVRA), MCL 780.766 and MCL
780.767, and therefore, judicial interpretation of the CVRA
may be applied to the corresponding provisions in the
juvenile code. In Re McEvoy, 267 Mich.App. 55,
61-63; 704 N.W.2d 78 (2005).
order of restitution is generally reviewed for an abuse of
discretion." Id. at 59. Although the trial
court's calculation of a restitution amount is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion, its factual findings are reviewed
for clear error. Corbin, 312 Mich.App. at 361.
"An abuse of discretion occurs when the court chooses an
outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes." People v Mahone, 294
Mich.App. 208, 212; 816 N.W.2d 436 (2011). "A trial
court also necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an
error of law." People v Al-Shara, 311 Mich.App.
560, 566; 876 N.W.2d 826 (2015). "When the question of
restitution involves a matter of statutory interpretation,
review de novo applies. Statutory interpretation is a
question of law subject to a review de novo." In re
McEvoy, 267 Mich.App. at 59. Furthermore, "[i]f the
plain and ordinary meaning of the language is clear, judicial
construction is normally neither permitted nor necessary.
Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in
mind the purpose of the act." Id. at 59-60
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
the juvenile code, MCL 712A.30 and MCL 712A.31, trial courts
are authorized to order a juvenile to pay restitution. In
relevant part, MCL 712A.30 states:
a juvenile offense results in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the juvenile offense,
or results in the seizure or impoundment of property of a
victim of the juvenile offense, the order of restitution may
require that the juvenile do 1 or more of the following, as
the property to the owner of the property or to a person
designated by the owner.
(b) If return of the property under subdivision (a) is
impossible, impractical, or inadequate, pay an amount equal
to the greater of subparagraph (i) or (ii),
less the value, determined as of the date the property is
returned, of ...