United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE [110]
AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO APPOINT COUNSEL [114]
[117]
Nancy
G. Edmunds United States District Judge
The
matter is before the Court on Defendant-Petitioner Desmond
Charles Minetee's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Dkt. 110.) The
government opposes this motion. (Dkt. 116.) Defendant also
requests the appointment of counsel. (Dkts. 114, 117.) For
the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's
§ 2255 motion and DENIES his motions for the appointment
of counsel.
I.
Background
Defendant
was charged in this matter with carjacking in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2119(1) and using, brandishing, and discharging
a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (Dkt. 35.) The charges
stemmed from an incident in which Defendant approached a man
in his car, pointed a handgun at him, and demanded his car.
(See dkt. 52, PgID 194.) As the man exited the car,
Defendant fired a shot at the ground near him and the victim
fled. (Id.)
On
February 1, 2016, Defendant pleaded guilty to the §
924(c) count. (Id. at PgID 193.) In exchange for his
plea, the government dismissed the carjacking count.
(Id. at PgID 198.) The Court imposed a sentence of
84 months of imprisonment and entered judgment on June 16,
2016. (Dkt. 89.) Defendant did not file a direct appeal. On
July 19, 2019, Defendant filed a motion requesting counsel to
assist him in the filing of a motion under § 2255. (Dkt.
108.) The Court denied that motion. (Dkt. 109.) On August 6,
2019, Defendant brought the instant motion. (Dkt. 110.)
Defendant also renewed his request for the appointment of
counsel twice. (Dkts. 114, 117.)
II.
Legal Standard
Under
§ 2255(a), “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence
of a [federal] court . . . claiming the right to be released
. . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” To prevail
on a § 2255 motion, the petitioner must allege:
“(1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a
sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an
error of fact or law that was so fundamental as to render the
entire proceeding invalid.” Mallett v. United
States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2003); see
also Anderson v. United States, 246 F.Supp.2d 758, 760
(E.D. Mich. 2003).
III.
Analysis
Defendant
asks the Court to vacate his conviction under § 924(c)
because the Supreme Court invalidated § 924(c)(3)(B) as
unconstitutionally vague in United States v. Davis,
139 S.Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). The government argues that
Defendant is not entitled to relief under Davis.
Under
§ 924(c), it is a federal crime to use or carry a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The
statute defines “crime of violence” as an offense
that is a felony and
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of
another, or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the offense.
§ 924(c)(3). Subsection (A) is known as the
“elements clause, ” and subsection (B) is known
as the “residual clause.” While Davis
invalidated § 924(c)'s residual clause, it left
intact § 924(c)'s elements clause. Thus, a
conviction under § 924(c) remains valid if the predicate
offense is a crime of violence under the elements clause.
Here,
the underlying offense is carjacking as alleged in count one
of the indictment. (See dkt. 35, PgID 156.) The
Sixth Circuit recently held that “carjacking
constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s
elements clause.” See United States v.
Jackson, 918 F.3d 467, 486 (6th Cir. 2019). Thus,
Davis has no impact on Defendant's case and his
conviction is ...