United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION (ECF NO. 11)
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
In this
putative collective action, Plaintiff Jerry Huddleston, on
behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals,
alleges that Defendants Sloan Environmental Services, Inc.
and Eric Sloan (collectively, “Sloan”) willfully
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201
(the “FLSA”) when Sloan failed to pay required
overtime. (See Compl., ECF No. 4.) Sloan denies the
allegations.
On
November 11, 2019, Huddleston filed a motion seeking to
conditionally certify the following proposed collective under
the FLSA:
All current and former hourly employees who worked for Sloan
Environmental Services, Inc. at any time in the past three
years.
(Mot., ECF No. 11, PageID.121.) Huddleston also seeks an
order from the Court (1) approving his counsel as counsel for
the proposed collective, (2) approving his proposed form of
notice and authorizing dissemination of that notice to each
member of the proposed collective by mail and email, (3)
requiring Sloan to identify and produce the names, phone
numbers, last known addresses, and email addresses of all
proposed collective members in a computer-readable format
within 14 days, and (4) giving members of the proposed
collective 45 days from the date the notice is mailed to join
this case if they so choose. (See id.,
PageID.118-119.)
Sloan
filed a response to the motion on December 2, 2019.
(See Resp., ECF No. 13.) Sloan does not object to
most of Huddleston's requested relief. However, Sloan
does object to the scope of the proposed collective and how
long Sloan should be given to produce the names and contact
information of the members of the proposed collective.
(See id.)
Sloan
first argues that Huddleston's “proposed collective
and notice associated with that proposed collective[] should
be limited at this stage to those similarly situated, hourly
employees employed by [Sloan] in the last two years, ”
not three years as Huddleston requests. (Id.,
PageID.156.) Sloan says that the proposed collective should
only look back two years because “under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the statute of limitations is two
years.” (Id., PageID.159.)
The
Court disagrees. As Sloan acknowledges, the FLSA's
two-year statute of limitations “can be extended to
three years in situations where the employer knew or showed
reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was
prohibited by the statute.” (Id.) And
Huddleston has alleged such a “willful” violation
in this case.
(See
Compl., ECF No. 4.) Where, as here, a plaintiff
“alleges that the employer's violations [of the
FLSA] were willful, but willfulness is disputed …
courts in this district and elsewhere generally find that a
three-year limitations period is appropriate to use in the
notice to potential class members.” Kim v. Detroit
Med. Informatics, LLC, 2019 WL 6307196, at *5
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2019) (citing cases). As another Judge
on this Court previously explained:
Given the fact that opt-in notice at this early stage of the
litigation is to be construed broadly in furtherance of the
remedial purposes of the FLSA … and the fact that it
would be prudent to cast a wider net with respect to
potential plaintiffs at the early stage, and then limit the
class-if appropriate-in the second phase of the collective
action process, the Court will apply a three-year statute of
limitations period for potential members of the exempt
classes. The Court finds this route is more practical than
the route prescribed in its earlier order of mailing a second
round of notices to potential opt-in members if the Court
finds the defendants' actions constitute willfulness
later in the proceedings.
Matthews v. ALC Partner, Inc., 2009 WL 10680524, at
*3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 2009) (internal citations omitted).
The Court finds the reasoning of Kim,
Matthews, and the cases cited in those decisions
persuasive. And Sloan has neither identified any contrary
authority nor supported its argument that the proposed
collective should be limited to two years in any other
meaningful way. The Court therefore will certify the proposed
three-year collective defined in Huddleston's
motion.[1]
Second,
Sloan “ask[s] that [it] be given 30 days, as opposed to
14 days, to produce names, last known addresses, last known
telephone numbers, and known email addresses of [its] current
and former hourly employees.” (Resp., ECF No. 12,
PageID.160.) Sloan has not explained why it needs this
additional time. However, due to the forthcoming Christmas
holiday, the Court will grant Sloan some limited additional
time to produce the names and contact information of its
employees. Sloan shall produce this information to Huddleston
by no later than December 30, 2019.
Accordingly,
for all of the reasons stated above, Huddleston's motion
for conditional certification is GRANTED as
follows:
• The Court conditionally certifies a collective of all
current and former hourly employees who worked for Sloan
Environmental Services, Inc. at ...