United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS , ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION , DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT , AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
("SSA") denied Plaintiff Eric Griffin Walker's
application for supplemental security income and disability
insurance benefits in a decision issued by an Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ"). ECF 11-3, PgID 228-38. On appeal
to the SSA Appeals Council, the Council vacated the ALJ's
determination and remanded the action. Id. at
245-46. On remand, the ALJ held a second hearing and again
issued a decision denying Walker's application for
supplemental security income and disability insurance
benefits. ECF 11-2, PgID 47-70. After the SSA Appeals Council
declined to review the ruling, Walker appealed. ECF 1. The
Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Patricia T.
Morris, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. ECF 3, 15, 19. The magistrate judge issued a report
and recommendation ("Report") suggesting that the
Court deny Walker's motion and grant the
Commissioner's motion. ECF 23.
timely filed objections to the Report. ECF 24. After
examining the record and considering Walker's objections
de novo, the Court has concluded that his arguments do not
have merit. Accordingly, the Court will overrule the
objections, adopt the Report's findings, deny
Walker's motion for summary judgment, and grant the
Commissioner's motion for summary judgment.
Report properly details the events giving rise to
Walker's action against the Commissioner. ECF 23, PgID
1884-1932. The Court will adopt that portion of the Report.
Rule 72(b) governs the review of a magistrate judge's
report. A district court's standard of review depends
upon whether a party files objections. The Court need not
undertake any review of portions of a Report to which no
party has objected. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
149-50 (1985). De novo review is required, however, if the
parties "serve and file specific written objections to
the proposed findings and recommendations." Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b)(2). In conducting a de novo review, "[t]he
district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter
to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed.R.Civ.P.
who receive an adverse final decision from the Commissioner
may appeal the decision to a federal district court. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case under §
405(g), the Court "must affirm the Commissioner's
conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has
failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made
findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the
record." Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
Substantial evidence consists of "more than a scintilla
of evidence but less than a preponderance" such that
"a reasonable mind might accept [the evidence] as
adequate to support a conclusion." Cutlip v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286
(6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). An ALJ may consider the
entire body of evidence without directly addressing each
piece in his decision. Loral Def. Sys. - Akron v.
N.L.R.B., 200 F.3d 436, 453 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted). "Nor must an ALJ make explicit credibility
findings as to each bit of conflicting testimony, so long as
his factual findings as a whole show that he implicitly
resolved such conflicts." Id. (internal
quotations and citation omitted) (alteration omitted).
raises three objections. The Court will address each in turn.
Walker argues that the magistrate judge failed to address his
claim that the ALJ erred by not providing "good
reasons" for discounting the opinion of Dr. Chapman-a
treating physician. ECF 24, PgID 1950. But the magistrate
judge did address the various reasons that the ALJ cited in
affording Dr. Chapman's opinion only little weight. See
ECF 23, PgID 1942-44. For example, the ALJ found that Dr.
Chapman's findings had internal inconsistencies, that Dr.
Chapman's later progress reports indicated that Walker
was "much better" and that his systems were
functioning as "normal," that Walker's physical
activity level-including extensive trips to North Dakota and
Europe-was inconsistent with a person with such severe
ailments as Dr. Chapman opined, and that the weight of the
medical evidence was contrary to Dr. Chapman's opinion.
See ECF 11-2, PgID 63-66. The reasons cited by the ALJ are
sufficient to discount Dr. Chapman's opinion on
Walker's work-like abilities. See Hensley v.
Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2009). Walker's
first objection therefore lacks merit.
extent that Walker is merely rehashing his argument from his
motion for summary judgment that the ALJ failed to provide
sufficiently specific "good reasons" for affording
Dr. Chapman's opinion little weight, his objection is
improper. The magistrate judge sufficiently addressed and
properly rejected that argument in her Report. See
Bentley v. Colvin, No. 16-11314, 2017 WL 3768941, at
*2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2017). The ALJ cited to numerous
"good reasons" for discounting Dr. Chapman's
opinion that Walker's condition was severe, including