Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Huey v. Jackson

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

December 17, 2019

DOUGLAS EUGENE HUEY, Petitioner,
v.
SHANE JACKSON, Respondent.

          OPINION

          PAUL L. MALONEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.

         Discussion

         I. Factual allegations

         Petitioner Douglas Eugene Huey is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility, (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon County, Michigan.

         The Michigan Court of Appeals opinion provided the following summary of the pertinent facts from Petitioner's case:

This case arises out of a traffic stop of defendant's pickup truck and an attendant consensual search of the vehicle. Defendant had driven Meghan Nelson 1 to Walmart and waited outside while she bought a box of cold medicine containing pseudoephedrine, a chemical ingredient used to manufacture methamphetamine. Defendant then drove Nelson to Home Depot. After entering the store with Nelson, defendant picked out a large bottle of drain cleaner that also contained chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, and handed it to Nelson, who paid for it. The purchases of the two items occurred within a time span of 12 minutes.
After they left Home Depot, Michigan State Police Trooper Justin Reed pulled defendant's truck over for a faulty muffler. Sergeant David Crilly of the Coldwater Police Department arrived to assist Reed. As he was pulling the vehicle over, defendant told Nelson to hide the drain cleaner in her purse, and she did so. Defendant consented to a search of his truck, whereupon Reed discovered the medicine containing pseudoephedrine sitting on or near Nelson's purse at a location inside the truck that had been accessible to both occupants. Crilly discovered the drain cleaner inside of Nelson's open purse. Defendant admitted to Reed that he had driven Nelson to Walmart and Home Depot. He also admitted that he knew that pseudoephedrine and drain cleaner were chemicals used to make methamphetamine and that he knew how to make methamphetamine. Defendant further admitted that he had been in trouble with methamphetamine in the past. However, defendant denied that the medicine and the drain cleaner were his or that he was going to use them to make methamphetamine.
Nelson initially told police that the medicine was for a cold and that the drain cleaner was for a clogged drain at defendant's house. She then changed her story and said that she knew that the items were used to make methamphetamine and that she had bought them for defendant with the intent of trading them for $50 worth of methamphetamine. She then reversed herself yet again and told police that she was not buying the items for anyone. At trial, Nelson testified that she had purchased the items to trade to defendant for methamphetamine, and that she frequently engaged in similar transactions with defendant (in which she would buy ingredients for making methamphetamine and then trade them to defendant for methamphetamine once he had manufactured it). Nelson admitted at trial that she was testifying in accordance with a plea agreement that she had reached with the prosecution.
1 Nelson was also charged in connection with this incident, but entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution in return for her testimony at defendant's trial.

People v. Huey, No. 332955, at 1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug 15, 2017), http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170815c33295546332955.opn.pdf.

         Following a jury trial in the Branch County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of Operating or Maintaining a Lab Involving Methamphetamine under Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7401c(2)(f), and fourth habitual offender, under Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.12. On April 18, 2016, the court sentenced Petitioner to a prison term of 15 to 40 years.

         On November 4, 2019, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the application is deemed filed when handed to prison authorities for mailing to the federal court. Cook v. Stegall, 295 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir. 2002). Petitioner signed his application on November 4, 2019. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.25.) The petition was received by the Court on November 6, 2019. For purposes of this opinion, the Court has given Petitioner the benefit of the earliest possible filing date. See Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the date the prisoner signs the document is deemed under Sixth Circuit law to be the date of handing to officials) (citing Goins v. Saunders, 206 Fed.Appx. 497, 498 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006)).

         The petition and the accompanying brief raise twenty grounds for relief, as follows:

I. [PETITIONER]'S CONVICTION FOR POSSESSING A CHEMICAL TO MANUFACTURE METHAMPHETAMINE MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE IT RESTS ON CONSTITUTIONALLY INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF THE CHARGE, WHERE THERE WAS NO PROOF [PETITIONER] OWNED OR CONTROLLED ANY CHEMICAL OR LABORATORY EQUIPMENT, AND NO PROOF [PETITIONER] HAD KNOWLEDGE THAT ITEMS IN THE VEHICLE WERE OR WOULD BE USED TO MANUFACTURE METHAMPHETAMINE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN PROVIDING A JURY INSTRUCTION THAT DID NOT CONTAIN EACH ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
III. [PETITIONER]'S CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED OR REVERSED BACK TO TRIAL COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE [PETITIONER] WAS CHARGED WITH OPERATING/MAINTAINING A LABORATORY INVOLVING METHAMPHETAMINE MCL 333.7401c(2)(f) ALSO DESCRIBED AS OWNING OR POSSESSING CHEMICALS TO MANUFACTURE METHAMPHETAMINE MCL 333.7401c(1)(b) WHICH IS A 20-YEAR FELONY AND WHICH [PETITIONER] WAS SENTENCED UNDER RECEIVING 15-40 YEARS IN PRISON WHEN BY M. CRIM JI 12.1b, IT CLEARLY STATES KNOWINGLY OWNING OR POSSESSING THE DESCRIBED CHEMICALS IS A 10-YEAR OFFENSE NOT A 20-YEAR OFFENSE.
IV. A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED IN [PETITIONER]'S CASE BECAUSE M.CRIM JI 12.1b THAT WAS INTRODUCED TO THE JURY WAS INCOMPLETE, OMITTING KEY INFORMATION THAT CAUSED AN INJUSTICE TO HIS CASE AS A RESULT OF PIECEMEAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS BY THE PROSECUTION CUSTOMIZED TO FIT THE DIRECTION OF THE PROSECUTION, MAKING THIS TRIAL UNFAIR WHEN THE ACTUAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS M.CRIM JI 12.1b STATES THAT OWNING OR POSSESSING THE DESCRIBED CHEMICALS IS A 10-YEAR OFFENSE, NOT A 20-YEAR OFFENSE WHICH [PETITIONER] WAS SENTENCED UNDER.
V. [PETITIONER]'S CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED OR REVERSED FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE FOR NOT RESEARCHING THE OFFENSE CHARGED AND HAVING NO STRATEGY TO PROCEED TO TRIAL; RESULTING IN A MANIFEST INJUSTICE.
VI. [PETITIONER]'S CONVICTION FOR POSSESSING A CHEMICAL TO MANUFACTURE METHAMPHETAMINE MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE IT RESTS ON CONSTITUTIONALLY INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF THE CHARGE WHERE THERE WAS NO PROOF [PETITIONER] OWNED OR CONTROLLED ANY CHEMICAL OR LABORATORY EQUIPMENT, AND NO PROOF [PETITIONER] HAD KNOWLEDGE THAT ITEMS IN THE VEHICLE WERE OR WOULD BE USED TO MANUFACTURE METHAMPHETAMINE.
VII. [PETITIONER]'S CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED OR REVERSED FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE FOR NOT PROPERLY RESEARCHING THE OFFENSE CHARGED AND HAVING NO STRATEGY TO PROCEED TO TRIAL; THE RESULT OF WHICH IS A MANIFEST INJUSTICE.
VIII. A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED IN [PETITIONER]'S CASE BECAUSE M.CRIM JI 12.1b THAT WAS INTRODUCED TO THE JURY WAS INCOMPLETE, OMITTING KEY INFORMATION THAT CAUSED AN INJUSTICE TO THE CASE AS A RESULT OF PIECEMEAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS BY THE PROSECUTION'S CUSTOMIZATION TO FIT THE DIRECTION OF THE PROSECUTION, MAKING THIS TRIAL UNFAIR WHEN THE ACTUAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS M.CRIM JI 12.1b STATES THAT OWNING OR POSSESSING THE DESCRIBED CHEMICALS IS A 10-YEAR OFFENSE, NOT A 20-YEAR OFFENSE, WHICH [PETITIONER] WAS SENTENCED UNDER.
IX. [PETITIONER]'S CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED OR REVERSED BACK TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE [PETITIONER] WAS CHARGED WITH OPERATING/MAINTAINING A LABORATORY INVOLVING METHAMPHETAMINE MCL 333.7401c(2)(4) ALSO DESCRIBED AS OWNING OR POSSESSING CHEMICALS TO MANUFACTURE METHAMPHETAMINE MCL 333.7401c(1)(B) WHICH IS A 20-YEAR FELONY AND WHICH [PETITIONER] WAS SENTENCED UNDER RECEIVING 15-40 YEARS IN PRISON WHEN BY M.CRIM JI 12.1b IT CLEARLY STATES KNOWINGLY OWNING OR POSSESSING THE DESCRIBED CHEMICALS IS A 10-YEAR OFFENSE AND NOT A 20-YEAR OFFENSE.
X. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED [PETITIONER] TO THE PENALTY PORTION OF MCL 333.7401c(2)(f) WHICH ENHANCED [PETITIONER]'S SENTENCE TO A 20-YEAR MAXIMUM, WHEN [PETITIONER] WAS ONLY FOUND GUILTY OF MCL 333.7401c(1)(b) FOR OWNING/POSSESSING CHEMICALS, WHICH CARRIES ONLY A 10-YEAR MAXIMUM PRISON TERM, WHICH IS CLEARLY DEFINED BY STATUTE AND BINDING MICHIGAN CASE LAW; THE RESULT OF WHICH IS AN INVALID SENTENCE.
XI. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT MAKING A FORMAL OBJECTION TO THE PENALTY PORTION OF MCL 333.7401c(2)(f), SUBSEQUENTLY, APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS LIKEWISE INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT RAISING TRIAL COUNSEL'S SENTENCING ERRORS ON APPEAL.
XII. THE TRIAL COURT IS REQUIRED TO WAIVE “GOOD CAUSE” WHEN THE CONVICTION IS THE RESULT OF A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT UNDER PEOPLE V CARPENTIER, 446 MICH 19 (1994), AS SUCH, AS DEFENDANT MAY ALWAYS CHALLENGE WHETHER THE STATE HAD A RIGHT TO BRING A DEFENDANT TO TRIAL. SEE ALSO, PEOPLE V CHAMBERS, 2008 MICH APP LEXIS 410 (FEB. 26, 2008), WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO SHOW CAUSE WHERE HE WAS SENTENCED WITHOUT EVER BEING FOUND GUILTY.
XIII. [PETITIONER] IS ENTITLED TO RESENTENCING BECAUSE HIS MINIMUM TERM WAS AN UNREASONABLE AND DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCE. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF [PETITIONER]'S 6.500 MOTION WAS IMPROPER AND SHOULD BE GRANTED FOR RESENTENCING.
XIV. [PETITIONER] IS ENTITLED TO RESENTENCING BECAUSE HIS MINIMUM TERM WAS AN UNREASONABLE AND DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCE. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF [PETITIONER]'S 6.500 MOTION WAS IMPROPER AND SHOULD BE GRANTED FOR RESENTENCING.
XV. [PETITIONER] WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AS GUARANTEED UNDER BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE THE JURY THE REQUISITE PRE-TRIAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND FAILED TO GIVE COMPLETE JURY INSTRUCTIONS; THE RESULT OF WHICH DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS LIBERTY IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS ENUMERATED HEREIN.
XVI. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS FUNDAMENTAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AS GUARANTEED UNDER BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS, WHEN THE TRIAL COURT, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE COUNSEL ALLOWED THE JURY TO DECIDE PETITIONER'S FATE BY AND THROUGH A DEFECTIVE VERDICT FORM THAT ERRONEOUSLY COMBINED TWO CHARGES INTO ONE; THE RESULT WAS THAT THE JURY WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN A NOT GUILTY VERDICT ON THE APPROPRIATE CHARGE.
XVII. PETITIONER WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AS GUARANTEED UNDER BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL ABANDONED PETITIONER IN HIS REPRESENTATION AS ENUMERATED HEREIN, THE RESULT OF WHICH IS STRUCTURAL ERROR.
XVIII. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS FUNDAMENTAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED UNDER BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, WHEN APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO MASTER THE TRIAL RECORD AND RAISE THESE MERITORIOUS “DEAD BANG WINNER” ISSUES ON PETITIONER'S APPEAL AS OF RIGHT.
XIX. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED WHERE PETITIONER CAN ESTABLISH “GOOD CAUSE” FOR NOT BRINGING HIS ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT PREVIOUSLY, AND “ACTUAL PREJUDICE” DUE TO THE ISSUE OF HIS ONGOING GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE WHILE INCARCERATED AS OUTLINED HEREIN.
XX. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS FUNDAMENTAL PROTECTIONS TO A FAIR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING BY AND THROUGH THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERROR THAT TOOK PLACE AT THE HANDS OF THE TRIAL COURT, THE PROSECUTION, DEFENSE COUNSEL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL.

(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22; Pet'r's Br., ECF No. 2, PageID.39, 44, 46, 49, 51, 54.)

         II. AEDPA standard

         This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). The AEDPA “prevents federal habeas ‘retrials'” and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is “intentionally difficult to meet.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (internal quotation omitted).

         The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court may consider only the holdings, and not the dicta, of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 4 (2014); Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013); Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48-49 (2012); Williams, 529 U.S. at 381-82; Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570, 578-79 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “clearly established Federal law” does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the merits in state court. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited to an examination of the legal ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.