United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER (1) DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO STRIKE DECLARATION OF UNDISCLOSED WITNESS (ECF NO. 97) AND
(2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 72)
LINDA
V. PARKER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
On
April 11, 2017, Plaintiff Damon Applewhite, an
African-American assembly plant worker who was
medically-restricted from using his left arm, brought this
action against Defendant FCA USA LLC (“FCA”)
alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate,
retaliation, and race discrimination. (ECF No. 1.) Presently
before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, (ECF No. 72), and Motion to Strike Declaration of
Undisclosed Witness, (ECF No. 97.) The parties fully briefed
and the Court held a hearing with respect to the motions. For
the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies
in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and
denies Defendant's Motion to Strike as moot.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
has worked in FCA's Warren Truck Assembly plant off and
on since 1993. (ECF No. 72-2 at Pg. ID 766.) For the past
eight years, he has worked as a Floater in the Quality
Inspection Center, reporting to Terry Wyka-the Quality
Control Supervisor. (Id. at Pg. ID 768, 772.)
Floaters
work some of many quality inspection tasks during the course
of their employment. (Id. at Pg. ID 771.) These
tasks include, among others, “exterior, ”
“interior, ” “underbody” (the pit),
“Buzz/Shake/Rattle (BSR), ” “underhood,
” “trim, ” “door line, ”
“electrical, ” and “buy off.” (ECF
No. 77-9; ECF No. 72 at Pg. ID 731.) Supervisors use flex
charts, which indicate the tasks for which an employee
previously received training, to assign Floaters to open
tasks at the beginning of each shift. (ECF No. 72-2 at Pg. ID
773-75.) Employees receive additional on-the-job training as
needed and must complete each assigned task before the next
truck comes down the line. (Id.; ECF No. 72 at Pg.
ID 732.)
Plaintiff
injured his left arm in 2002 at the FCA assembly plant. (ECF
No. 72-2 at Pg. ID 789.) As a result, doctors prohibited
Plaintiff from using his left arm. (Id.) It is
unclear how often Plaintiff performed his assignments within
his restriction (using only the right arm) and how often he
performed them despite his restrictions (using both arms).
On May
2, 2016, a supervisor (not Mr. Wyka) assigned Plaintiff to
the Door Line. (Id. at Pg. ID 795.) After using his
left arm for a period of time, Plaintiff informed Mr. Wyka
that working the Door Line caused pain. (Id. at
795-98.) Mr. Wyka moved Plaintiff to BSR, where Plaintiff
worked for the remainder of the shift without complaint.
(Id.) The next day, May 3, Mr. Wyka assigned
Plaintiff to the Door Line. (Id.) Plaintiff informed
Mr. Wyka of his left arm restriction. (Id.) Mr. Wyka
moved Plaintiff to BSR and the record does not suggest that
Plaintiff complained thereafter. (Id.) Mr. Wyka also
checked FCA's medical system to confirm the restriction.
(Id.) Mr. Wyka then consulted other FCA Supervisors
and they determined that all quality inspection tasks require
the use of two arms. (ECF No. 72-4 at Pg. ID 913.) Plaintiff
was invited into an office and told that no work was
available for him. (Id. at Pg. ID 900.) Plaintiff
stated that he could perform some available quality
inspection tasks, including BSR. (ECF No. 72-2 at Pg. ID
780-81, 790.) Still, Defendant sent Plaintiff home and placed
him on medical leave with sick and accident benefits. (ECF
No. 72-12 at Pg. ID 1096.)
On May
10, while on leave, Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge alleging
race and disability discrimination. (ECF No. 72-18.) Also
while on leave, Plaintiff provided FCA with periodic updates
from his doctor regarding his condition. (ECF No. 72-2 at Pg.
ID 804.) In February 2017, Plaintiff's doctor lifted his
restriction and he returned to FCA that month. (Id.)
On
April 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed this suit. (ECF No. 1.) Count
I alleges disability discrimination and failure to
accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), and Count II alleges the same under
Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act
(“PWDCRA”). Count III alleges Defendant
retaliated against Plaintiff following his reasonable
accommodation request in violation of the ADA, and Count IV
alleges the same under the PWDCRA. Count V alleges Defendant
committed race discrimination by treating him differently
than Caucasian workers as it relates to performance
assessment, training, and work assignments in violation of
Title VII, and Count VI alleges the same under Michigan's
Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”).
MOTION
TO STRIKE
On May
31, 2019, Plaintiff filed his response in opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 77.)
The response includes the declaration of Jerel Brooks
(“Jerel Brooks Declaration”). (ECF No. 77-15.)
The Parties do not dispute that Plaintiff did not identify
Mr. Brooks in Plaintiff's initial disclosures, in his
response to Defendant's discovery requests, or during his
deposition. The Parties also do not dispute that Plaintiff
failed to timely supplement his disclosures and responses.
Defendant
argues that the Court should strike the Jerel Brooks
Declaration because Plaintiff's failure to disclose and
timely supplement his responses were not substantially
justified or harmless, and Mr. Brooks's testimony was not
otherwise made known to Defendant. (ECF No. 97 at Pg. ID
1549, 1555.)
As the
Court did not consider the Jerel Brooks Declaration in
deciding Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, it
denies as moot Defendant's Motion to Strike.
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The central inquiry is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). After
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56 mandates
summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case
and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The
movant has the initial burden of showing “the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at
323. Once the movant meets this burden, the “nonmoving
party must come forward with specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To demonstrate a genuine issue, the nonmoving party must
present sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury
could find for that party; a “scintilla of
evidence” is insufficient. See Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. at 252.
“A
party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed” must designate specifically the materials in
the record supporting the assertion, “including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). The court must accept as true the
non-movant's evidence and draw “all justifiable
inferences” in the non-movant's favor. See
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255.
COUNTS
I & II:
VIOLATION
OF THE ADA & PDCRA
(DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION)
(DENIAL
OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION)
Plaintiff
argues that Defendant violated the ADA and PDCRA by placing
him on involuntary medical leave and failing to accommodate
his disability. (ECF No. 77 at Pg. ID 1192.) The Parties do
not dispute that the resolution of a plaintiff's ADA
claim will generally resolve the plaintiff's PDCRA claim
since the PDCRA substantially mirrors the ADA. See Cotter
v. Ajilon Serv., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir.
2002), overruled on different grounds by Lewis v.
Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 313
(6th Cir. 2012).
“To
recover on a claim for discrimination under the ADA, a
plaintiff must show that he or she (1) is disabled, (2)
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the
position, with or without accommodation, and (3) suffered an
adverse employment action because of his or her
...