United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE
PLAINTIFF'S ASSAULT AND BATTERY CLAIM
H. CLELAND UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Angela Horton filed a complaint alleging the following counts
against Defendants City of Detroit and Detroit police officer
(1) Count I: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendant
Parker-Smith for excessive force in violation of the Fourth
(2) Count II: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 municipal liability claim
against Defendant City of Detroit;
(3) Count III: state law claim for assault and
I and II allege federal claims over which the court has
original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Count III is a state law claim. Since Plaintiff's federal
and state law claims arise out of the same incident and share
common operative facts, the court is permitted to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, for the reasons
explained below, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's state law claim would not promote judicial
economy, the convenience of the parties, fairness, or comity.
Therefore, the court will dismiss the state law claim without
alleges that May 3, 2018, while walking home, she stopped to
rest on the porch of an abandoned house near Palmer Street in
Detroit, Michigan. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) While she was
resting, she claims that Defendant Parker-Smith exited a
nearby house, identified herself as a police officer, and
told Plaintiff to leave the property. (Id. at
PageID.8.) Plaintiff asserts that when she began to leave the
property, Defendant Parker-Smith attempted to run her over
with her vehicle multiple times and fired a gunshot in her
direction in attempts to frighten Plaintiff. (Id.)
Plaintiff attempted to flee but alleges that Defendant
Parker-Smith followed her and ultimately shot her in the left
leg, resulting in a fracture to Plaintiff's tibia and
fibula. (Id. at PageID.9.)
brings this action against Defendant Parker-Smith in her
individual and official capacity. Defendant City of Detroit
removed this action from state court and indicates in its
answer its intent to raise, among other defenses, the
doctrines of absolute, qualified, and governmental immunity.
(ECF No. 2, PageID.25-26.)
federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
each claim in an action that shares a common nucleus of
operative facts with a claim that invokes the court's
original jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). However, the federal court
need not exercise its authority to invoke supplemental
jurisdiction in every case in which it is possible to do so.
Id. at 726. Supplemental jurisdiction “is a
doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right.”
Id. Justification for this doctrine “lies in
considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness
to litigants.” Id. Therefore, “[i]n
deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . .
a judge must take into account concerns of comity, judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and the like.”
Senra v. Smithfield, 715 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir.
2013). If these considerations are not present, “a
federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over
state claims.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
Additionally, supplemental jurisdiction may be denied
“if the federal claims are dismissed before trial,
” if “it appears that the state issues
subsequently predominate, ” or “if the likelihood
of jury confusion” would be strong without separation
of the claims. Id. at 726-27.
U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes the federal court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction. A court has the discretion to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c) if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has ...