Wayne
County Circuit Court LC No. 18-006351-01-FH
Before: Gadola, P.J., and Servitto and Redford, JJ.
GADOLA, P.J.
Plaintiff
appeals by leave granted[1] the trial court's November 7, 2018
order granting defendant's, Deonton Autez Rogers's,
motion to quash several counts of the information. Defendant
was charged, as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11; with
discharging a firearm in a building causing physical injury,
MCL 750.234b(3); discharging a firearm in a building causing
serious impairment, MCL 750.234b(4); assault with a dangerous
weapon (felonious assault), MCL 750.82; possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm),
MCL 750.227b; felon in possession of a firearm
(felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f; fourth-degree child
abuse, MCL 750.136b(7); and ethnic intimidation, MCL
750.147b. On defendant's motion, the trial court
dismissed charges of discharging a firearm in a building
causing physical injury, the discharging a firearm in a
building causing serious impairment, and the ethnic
intimidation. On appeal, plaintiff challenges only the trial
court's dismissal of the ethnic intimidation charge. We
affirm the trial court's order granting defendant's
motion to quash the ethnic intimidation charge. We do so
despite the fact the trial court's reasoning constituted
legal error. As detailed in our opinion, the trial court
reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons.
I.
FACTS
This
case arises out of an altercation between defendant and the
victim, Kimora Steuball, on the night of July 23, 2018.
Steuball is a transgender person, which she explained to the
court means that she was assigned as a male at birth, and now
identifies as a woman, living her life and presenting herself
as such in society. On the night of the incident, Steuball
went to a gas station in Detroit to make a purchase. Upon
arrival at the gas station, she saw defendant inside the gas
station with a woman. Steuball got in line and defendant
began talking to her, using derogatory terms. According to
Steuball, defendant made various offensive statements to her,
including "you're a nigga." Steuball responded
that "nigga is somebody that identifies themselves as a
man, carry themselves as a man. I don't do that. I'm
a transgender." Defendant then asked Steuball about her
sex organs and asked Steuball if he could see "it."
Steuball tried to ignore defendant, but he continued to make
derogatory remarks, which Steuball described as
"gay" in nature, and included calling her a man and
asking to see her penis. Defendant then pulled out a gun and
threatened to kill her. Steuball was frightened that
defendant would follow through on his threat to kill her. The
woman with defendant told defendant to leave Steuball alone
and to leave the gas station. While defendant was speaking to
Steuball, a child that had arrived in the car with defendant
entered the gas station. Defendant subsequently walked in
close proximity to Steuball, gun in hand, moving toward the
exit. Steuball testified that she feared that defendant would
turn around and shoot her before leaving the gas station.
Steuball further testified that transgender people are often
attacked and harmed and she feared for her life. Reacting to
the threat from defendant, she grabbed at defendant's
hand as he came near her in an attempt to get the gun away
from him. A struggle between the two ensued during which
Steuball never had control over the gun. During this
struggle, defendant kept his finger on the trigger. At some
point during the struggle, the gun fired into Steuball's
left shoulder. Steuball was then able to grab the gun from
defendant. The woman with defendant took the gun from
Steuball and moved toward the exit. Defendant then ran to the
gas station exit, whereupon the woman with defendant gave him
back the gun. Defendant then got into his car and the child
followed him out, climbing into defendant's car with him.
Steuball was taken to the hospital, where she spent several
days being treated for a shattered shoulder, including
undergoing surgery.
At
defendant's preliminary examination, surveillance footage
was shown detailing the incident. Defendant objected to the
court binding him over on the two discharging a firearm
charges, asserting that he did not intentionally fire a
weapon at Steuball. With regard to the remaining charges
(including the ethnic intimidation charge), defendant
conceded that there were "questions of fact for a
jury." Relevant to the appeal at hand, the district
court found that "transgender" fell within the
statutory definition of "gender"[2] for purposes of
the ethnic intimidation charge.
In the
trial court, defendant filed a motion to quash the district
court's bindover of the two discharging a firearm in a
building charges and the ethnic intimidation charge. With
respect to the ethnic intimidation charge, defendant argued
that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that defendant
committed a malicious physical act accompanied by a specific
intent to harass Steuball because of her gender. In an
amended motion to quash, defendant further contended that the
ethnic intimidation statute did not apply to situations
involving transgender parties. The trial court granted
defendant's motion to quash, finding that with respect to
ethnic intimidation the preliminary examination testimony
established that Steuball, not defendant, caused the physical
contact between the two by grabbing defendant's wrist.
The trial court further found that "gender" is
defined, for purposes of the Michigan Penal Code, to include
only masculine, feminine, and neuter genders, and therefore,
not transgender people, such that the ethnic intimidation
statute did not apply.
As
previously indicated, this Court granted the
prosecution's application for leave to appeal the trial
court's decision.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether
a defendant's conduct falls within the scope of a
criminal statute is a question of statutory interpretation,
which is reviewed de novo. People v Flick, 487 Mich.
1, 9; 790 N.W.2d 295 (2010). Additionally, "[a] district
court magistrate's decision to bind over a defendant and
a trial court's decision on a motion to quash an
information are reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
People v Dowdy, 489 Mich. 373, 379; 802 N.W.2d 239
(2011), see also People v March, 499 Mich. 389, 397;
886 N.W.2d 396 (2016) (a trial court's decision to quash
an information is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
"An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision falls
outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes." People v Zitka, 325 Mich.App. 38,
43; 922 N.W.2d 696 (2018) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). To the extent that a lower court bases its
decision on a motion to quash an information on an
interpretation of the law, our review of that interpretation
is de novo. March, 499 Mich. at 397. When a trial
court makes an error of law it necessarily abuses its
discretion. People v Duncan, 494 Mich. 713, 723; 835
N.W.2d 399 (2013).
III.
ANALYSIS
Defendant
was charged with ethnic intimidation under MCL 750.147b. The
statute provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of ethnic intimidation if that person
maliciously, and with specific intent to intimidate or harass
another person because of that person's race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin, does any of the
following:
(a) Causes physical contact with another person.
(b) Damages, destroys, or defaces any real or personal
property of another person.
(c) Threatens, by word or act, to do an act described in
subdivision (a) or (b), if there is reasonable cause to
believe that an act described in subdivision (a) or (b) will
occur.
The
most important goal of statutory interpretation is to discern
and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Dowdy, 489 Mich. at 379. If a statute's language
is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written, and
judicial construction is not required or permitted.
People v Gardner, 482 Mich. 41, 50; 753 N.W.2d 78
(2008).
Relevant
to the instant matter, the word "gender" is not
specifically defined within MCL 750.147b. The trial court
opined that, irrespective of whether the prosecution brought
the ethnic intimidation charge against defendant based upon
sub (a) or sub (c) of that statute, the lower court made an
error of law in binding defendant over on the charge
"based on the wording of MCL 750.147b and the definition
of 'gender.'" The trial court found that the
word "gender" is defined in the Penal Code, at MCL
750.10, as excluding transgender and that, as such, reference
to dictionary definitions of the word "gender" is
impermissible. We thus begin our analysis with addressing
whether the word ...