United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
L. Maloney, United States District Judge.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court
is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations
as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim
against Defendants Unknown Part(y)(ies) #1 and Unknown
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Lakeland Correctional Facility
(LCF) in Coldwater, Branch County, Michigan. The events about
which he complains, however, occurred at the Chippewa
Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County,
Michigan. Plaintiff sues Nurse Practitioner Brenda L.
Buchanan; Registered Nurses Unknown Haskie, Unknown Headley,
R. Stranly, Unknown Guild, and Theresa M. Merling; as well as
Kim Atkinson, Unknown Part(y)(ies) #1, and Unknown
alleges that while at URF in late January 2018, he injured
his back and received a conservative treatment plan from
medical staff. On February 3, 2018, Plaintiff was unable to
rise from his bed “due to extreme pain.” (Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Plaintiff was taken to the hospital and
diagnosed with herniated discs and a possible rupture.
Although Plaintiff was returned to the prison, he was unable
to rise from his bed for the next three days, February 5,
2019, through February 7, 2019.
that time, medical staff informed Plaintiff that if he wanted
treatment, he had to walk over to medical. If he wanted to
eat, use the restroom, or anything else, he would have to
walk. As a result, Plaintiff did not eat, use a toilet, or
take his psychiatric medicine for those three days. Over the
course of the three days, corrections officers on
Plaintiff's unit checked on Plaintiff and requested
medical staff come and help Plaintiff, but none came.
Plaintiff further asserts that “[m]y people finally
called [and] got me some treatment. [T]hey got me to a
wheelchair but I never was treated properly.”
40 days later, Plaintiff received a CT scan. He subsequently
received emergency surgery. He alleges that, “[d]ue to
lack of treatment an infection set in my spine and ate the
soft tissue and disc of my back.” (Id.)
Plaintiff had two or more surgeries to remove a disc and fuse
part of his spine. Plaintiff alleges that he remains in
constant pain, requires a cane to walk, is in rehabilitation,
and sees a neurosurgeon to discuss future surgeries he will
seeks mediation to determine acceptable relief.
Failure to State a Claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
claims arise under the Eighth Amendment for deprivation of
adequate medical care.
Failure to ...