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Barnett v. Fitz

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

January 14, 2020

Dylan Barnett, Plaintiff,
Victor Fitz et al., Defendants.



         This is a civil rights action brought by a parolee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.


         I. Factual allegations

         Plaintiff is presently a parolee from the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). Nonetheless, the MDOC indicates that Plaintiff is “held under custody, ” see (visited Jan. 2, 2020), and Plaintiff indicates that he is presently housed at the Cass County Jail. Plaintiff's complaint relates to the prosecution that resulted in his incarceration, his pretrial detention in the Cass County Jail, and his incarceration at the Thumb Correctional Facility (TCF) in Lapeer County, Michigan.

         Plaintiff sues Cass County Prosecutor Victor Fitz, Cass County Jail Corrections Officer Michel Bradley, and the Michigan Department of Corrections. Plaintiff alleges that on or about May 2015 he was charged with unlawful driving away of an automobile and larceny from a motor vehicle. He was only 15 years old at the time. It appears he was held in a juvenile facility and escaped. He reports that he was captured in Utah and returned to Michigan.

         Upon his return, he was waived into the adult criminal system. He was housed in the Cass County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that “they” did not know where to put him. They put him in booking. He did not get gym time and was frequently denied showers. He alleges that there were times that he went “weeks without showers.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)

         Plaintiff alleges that they later put him in solitary confinement. He was still denied showers and gym time. Plaintiff states additionally that he “was treated unfairly by a C/O Michel Bradley [who] would skip [Plaintiff for] showers and gym time because [Plaintiff] wasn't at the door.” (Id.)

         Plaintiff also alleges that being waived to adult court ruined his childhood. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that because he spent a lot of time in solitary confinement, he has a lot of disabilities.

         Plaintiff asks that the Court order reimbursement for the time he has lost and pain and suffering. (Id., PageID.4.)

         II. Failure to state a claim

         A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

         To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

         III. ...

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