United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
T. NEFF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action brought by a parolee under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is
required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true,
unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
is presently a parolee from the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC). Nonetheless, the MDOC indicates that
Plaintiff is “held under custody, ” see
(visited Jan. 2, 2020), and Plaintiff indicates that he is
presently housed at the Cass County Jail. Plaintiff's
complaint relates to the prosecution that resulted in his
incarceration, his pretrial detention in the Cass County
Jail, and his incarceration at the Thumb Correctional
Facility (TCF) in Lapeer County, Michigan.
sues Cass County Prosecutor Victor Fitz, Cass County Jail
Corrections Officer Michel Bradley, and the Michigan
Department of Corrections. Plaintiff alleges that on or about
May 2015 he was charged with unlawful driving away of an
automobile and larceny from a motor vehicle. He was only 15
years old at the time. It appears he was held in a juvenile
facility and escaped. He reports that he was captured in Utah
and returned to Michigan.
his return, he was waived into the adult criminal system. He
was housed in the Cass County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that
“they” did not know where to put him. They put
him in booking. He did not get gym time and was frequently
denied showers. He alleges that there were times that he went
“weeks without showers.” (Compl., ECF No. 1,
alleges that they later put him in solitary confinement. He
was still denied showers and gym time. Plaintiff states
additionally that he “was treated unfairly by a C/O
Michel Bradley [who] would skip [Plaintiff for] showers and
gym time because [Plaintiff] wasn't at the door.”
also alleges that being waived to adult court ruined his
childhood. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that because he
spent a lot of time in solitary confinement, he has a lot of
asks that the Court order reimbursement for the time he has
lost and pain and suffering. (Id., PageID.4.)
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).